Showing posts with label golden parachutes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label golden parachutes. Show all posts

Another Cautionary Tale about Conflicts of Interest: the CEO's Stretch Limousine, Golden Parachute, and Slush Fund

It remains fashionable in academic medicine to tolerate, if not celebrate conflicts of interest as necessary to support the "collaboration" needed for "innovation," while minimizing their risks (e.g., look here). 

Recently, another cautionary tale about how conflicts of interest signal the risk of all sorts of unpleasantness has appeared in the media.

A Sentinel Event: the First Conflicts Uncovered

In 2009, we wrote about some conflicts of interest at Wyckoff Heights Medical Center in my hometown of Brooklyn, NY.  The New York Daily News had reported that Dr. Addagada Rao, the hospital's chief of surgery was simultaneously the president and part-owner of a Caribbean medical school that funneled medical students to clerkships at Wyckoff.  The hospital's CEO, Rajiv Garg, was an investor in the same school.  At the time, I wrote,
This story illustrates another twist on conflicts of interest affecting the leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations. Many of the smaller not-for-profit hospitals, of which there are thousands in the US, may have minimal conflict of interest policies, which may be minimally enforced, without much transparency or accountability. The coziness of the leadership culture of such smaller institutions may preclude anyone within the culture from asking tough questions. The results may be total confusion as to whose interests particular leaders are serving. In particular, the interests of each hospital's patients may get lost in the shuffle. In this case, the interests of medical students may also get lost in the shuffle. Although the institutions involved may be small, and hence the conflicts may seem small in terms of their monetary value, they aggregate to contribute to the moral miasma that now is the atmosphere of health care.
You heard it here first.

The CEO's Golden Parachute

Fast forward to 2012. In January, the Daily News again reported that CEO Garg had been ousted, but that
Trustees at Wyckoff Heights Medical Center asked to consider a whopping $875,000 severance payout for its former CEO are balking at the package....

It seems that Garg's attorney claimed
They were on the verge of bankruptcy when he arrived. He reduced the debt by tens of millions of dollars.
However,
the hospital’s financial situation remains grim. According to the work group’s final report, Wyckoff’s liabilities are $91 million greater than its assets and it is saddled with $114 million in long-term debt.
So here is yet another example of a CEO personally profiting while his or her organization's finances fester.

The Chauffeured Cars, the Stretch Limousine

The the Daily News began chipping away at the other ways CEO Garg benefited from his leadership of the fiscally troubled hospital. A notable symbol of these benefits was a stretch limousine:
The ousted CEO of a debt-riddled Brooklyn hospital had his security guards ferry friends to the U.S. Open and his wife around town in a stretch limo, the Daily News has learned.

Rajiv Garg, the disgraced honcho of Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, also enjoyed his own commutes in the hospital-issued ride — a sleek, black $33,000 Lincoln Royale.
Garg rolled in style,
The beleaguered hospital bought the fancy car — equipped with a mini-bar, four champagne flutes and a fridge for chilling Dom PĂ©rignon — last summer for Garg It also owned two other cars for his use, sources said.

Several times a week, the limo was dispatched to take Garg’s wife from her job near the hospital to the couple’s midtown apartment, said an employee.

Sometimes, it picked her up and then swung by the hospital to get Garg and whisk them to dinner before dropping them home, sources said. Two or three times a month, the limo picked her up at home and took her shopping.

'I haven’t had a raise in seven years,' said the employee. 'They always tell us they don’t have any money. They spent it on cars.'

The limo has comfy leather seats with room to spare for six passengers and a stereo system capable of drowning out highway noise when Garg and his wife were driven in it to Washington.
More Conflicts of Interest Discovered

Then the Daily News started to reveal conflicts of interest beyond the ones we discussed in 2009:
Then-trustee Frank Chiarello was in a partnership that loaned money to hospital entities, according to a list of board members’ conflicts the Daily News eyeballed. The $2.5 million loan had an 18% interest rate, sources said, costing the hospital hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Chiarello, a real estate exec, resigned from the board last week.

Another trustee who quit the board last week, attorney John Rucigay, serves as a lawyer for other trustees, owns real estate with other trustees, and rents space to the Polish and Slavic Federal Credit Union — whose head of operations is yet another Wyckoff trustee, Agnieszka Poslednik.

Additional trustees on the conflicts list first reported by Crain’s New York Business, include Andrew Boiselle, whose Cebco Check Cashing Corp. does check-cashing business with hospital employees, and attorney Fred Haller, who provides legal services to Wyckoff employees about issues not related to the hospital.
Slush Funds and Bribes

Last week, the Daily News reported about findings by a judge that the CEO kept slush funds used to pay bribes:
Wyckoff Heights Medical Center kept a secret bank account that a former CEO used to bribe a disgraced state assemblyman, an upstate judge said in a court decision.

Orange County Supreme Court Judge Elaine Slobod’s decisionk brought to light new details about the Bushwick hospital’s alleged dealings with Tony Seminerio (D-Far Rockaway), who died in a North Carolina prison last year.

The bank account used for the Stockholm St. hospital’s payoffs to the corrupt pol belonged to 397 Himrod Corporation.

Former Wyckoff board chairman Emil Rucigay originally set up the company to buy real estate for the hospital to turn into a parking lot, the judge’s order said.

The bank account was kept active — though the corporation was dissolved in 2001. The bank account still had approximately $130,000 in it in 2008.

“[Wyckoff’s] CEO was using monies in the Himrod account to bribe Seminerio,” Slobad wrote in her decision last week, referring to Dominick Gio, who was the hospital’s head honcho at the time.

Gio refused to talk a reporter last week. Wcykoff’s interim CEO Ramon Rodriguez also declined to comment.

Money from the Himrod account was used to make payments totaling $15,000 to Seminerio, other court filings charge.
A Lexus, a Bentley, Oh My

Then the story really hit the big time when the New York Times picked it up yesterday. That report added some colorful details about how magnificently the CEO traveled:
In August 2009, Mr. Garg said, he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed his Lexus into a truck. He then lost his license. Asked why in the interview, he said he was not certain, though he offered several explanations, including unpaid tickets and previous accidents.

He then used the hospital’s cars — a Lincoln Town Car and a Cadillac Escalade — for himself and his family around the clock. They were driven by two security guards on overtime, a hospital official said.

He parked his other car, the $160,000 Bentley, at Wyckoff and had the hospital put the vehicle on its own insurance policy.

The limo only came later,
Mr. Garg said in the interview that he suspected that the drivers of the Town Car and the Escalade were eavesdropping on his conversations. So he had the hospital purchase a used stretch limousine for about $33,000.
Yet More Conflicts of Interest Discovered

The Times story also found more conflicts of interest. Some involved CEO Garg:
Mr. Garg introduced hospital officials to Skyscape, a provider of mobile medical references, in which he had a financial interest. Wyckoff signed a contract with the company worth at least $38,700, hospital records show, though the deal eventually fell through.

Others involved hospital trustees. This example might have affected patient care at the hospital:
Dr. Theophine Abakporo arrived at Wyckoff in 1996 from Harlem Hospital to work in emergency medicine. Originally from Nigeria, he said he found his way to the top blocked by what he believed was a clique of doctors at Wyckoff.

In 2009, according to data provided by MapLight.org, Dr. Abakporo, an American citizen, began donating money to the campaign of Representative Edolphus Towns, the Democrat who represents a nearby area. Mr. Towns, a longtime board member of Wyckoff, had by then been replaced by his chief of staff, Albert Wiltshire, on the board.

Dr. Abakporo gave $1,000 to the Towns campaign, then $750, according to election records.

With Mr. Wiltshire’s support, Dr. Abakporo became chairman of emergency medical services.

This example might also have affected patient care:
With his solicitous manner and tailored sport jackets, Gary Goffner, a pharmacist who serves on Wyckoff’s board, has long endeared himself to customers and doctors alike.

He inherited his pharmacy, Kraupner, from his father, a prominent Bushwick landlord as well as a pharmacist, who died recently. It is an old-fashioned store, crammed with supplies, the opposite of an orderly Rite Aid.

It is also a half-mile walk from Wyckoff, a disadvantage Mr. Goffner overcame through a contract that gave him exclusive access to Wyckoff patients as they were being discharged, and allowed him to keep an employee at the hospital to promote his business.

In summary, the Times found,
According to internal hospital documents, 13 of the hospital’s 22 board members declared at least one conflict of interest.
Summary

So, from a single story about conflicts of interest affecting the CEO and a medical leader at the hospital, we have gone to stories about widespread conflicts of interest affecting the hospital's board and leadership, about lavish payments and benefits to the CEO while the hospital's finances suffered, and allegations (by a judge) of bribes and slush funds. 

Recall that the Institute of Medicine's report on conflicts of interest in medicine and health care defined conflicts of interest as “circumstances that create a risk that professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.” While no particular conflict of interest is guaranteed to cause someone to abuse entrusted power, conflicts of interest create the risk of such abuse. The case of the leadership and governance of Wyckoff Heights Medical Center shows how such risks may manifest.

Yet we have noted again and again how leaders of supposedly mission-oriented non-profit medical organizations seem to be ignoring these risks while pursuing ever more money from health care corporations. We noted how the Chancellor of the University of California-San Francisco "has no qualms" about faculty's financial relationships with industry. Just this week at Brown University, my alma mater, while discussing a new conflicts of interest policy, we heard,
'People do have conflicts of interest, and it’s not the end of the world,' said Janet Blume, associate dean of the faculty.
Conflicts of interest may not lead to the apocalypse. However, they certainly may lead to all sorts of unpleasantness. As Joe Collier stated, “people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult." Conflicts of interest clearly lead to conflicted, and confused thinking, and such thinking may lead to bad decisions, and hence bad outcomes for patients' and the public's health. Worse, as the IOM asserted, conflicts of interest are a risk factor for outright corruption.

True health care reform might start with a reasoned discussion, based as much as possible on evidence, about the risks as well as the supposed benefits of conflicts of interest affecting those who make decisions about individual patients' health care, and about public health and health care policy.

Despite Recalls, Legal Settlements and Guilty Pleas - A $143.5 Million (or Perhaps $197 Million) Golden Parachute for the Former Drug Representative Who Is Now CEO of Johnson and Johnson

After 30 separate product recalls since 2009, and multiple legal settlements and guilty pleas, we noted that the former pharmaceutical representative who is now the CEO of Johnson and Johnson will be retiring. 

The $143.5 Million (or Perhaps $197 Million) Golden Parachute

The Wall Street Journal just reported his retirement will come with an immense golden parachute:
Johnson & Johnson Chairman and Chief Executive William Weldon stands to collect pension benefits and deferred compensation currently valued at $143.5 million after his retirement, according to new details released by the health-care conglomerate.

The details were:
Mr. Weldon, who will be succeeded as CEO by Vice Chairman Alex Gorsky, stands to collect benefits from two main sources. The present value of his accumulated pension benefits is $48.4 million, portions of which are paid out as a monthly annuity for life, according to Wednesday's filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

His pension's value places Mr. Weldon well into the top 10% of CEOs of Standard & Poor's 500 companies, said Paul Hodgson, chief communications officer and senior research associate at GMI Ratings, which tracks corporate-governance information.

Mr. Weldon also has amassed $95.1 million in nonqualified deferred-compensation plans. This represents parts of his salary and bonus that had been deferred in prior years, as well as company contributions to savings plans. Portions of Mr. Weldon's deferred compensation have been recorded each year as part of his total annual pay.

Of the $95.1 million, more than $70 million represents Mr. Weldon's accumulated balance from a legacy cash-incentive plan that J&J has discontinued and replaced with a new executive-compensation plan. This sum would be paid to Mr. Weldon at retirement, J&J said. All deferred compensation is subject to taxes.

Actually, an argument that the $143.5 million figure is an major under-estimate appeared in the Shearlings Got Plowed blog:
The MSM reports calculate only the cash values for soon to be Ex-CEO Weldon, not the present value of his stock options, at today's NYSE closing price for J&J of $65.08. So, that -- plus the vesting of his February 2012 JNJ RSUs and Stock Option awards [see page 45 of the link (but such amounts are ommitted from the year end 2011 proxy, on which the WSJ relied)] -- add about $53.47 million to the Weldon walkaway haul.

Thus, Mr Weldon's golden parachute may be as big as $197 million.

The Board's Justification for the Riches

Of course, the Johnson and Johnson board justified the latest additions to Mr Weldon's wealth, as reported by the WSJ:
In a regulatory filing Wednesday, the board said Mr. Weldon 'successfully managed our company through a challenging economic environment in 2011,' with solid financial results and advances in J&J's pharmaceutical pipeline.

The board added that while J&J made progress in addressing manufacturing-quality issues in 2011, 'continued focus is needed to address critical product supply and quality issues that impact our responsibility of being able to deliver products to patients and customers who need them.'

Johnson and Johnson's Recent Record

The board's upbeat assessment sharply contrasts with Johnson and Johnson's actual recent record.

As we discussed recently, Johnson and Johnson seems to have lost the ability to manufacture high quality products. It has had to make 30 separate product recalls since 2009. The latest was Liquid Infant Tylenol. (The current WSJ Health Blog list of recalls can be found here.)  This seems to be more than a "rough patch," which is how the WSJ article described the manufacturing problems.

In addition, the WSJ article failed to mention that Johnson and Johnson also has an amazing recent record of ethical lapses and guilty pleas, including:
- Convictions in two different states in 2010 for misleading marketing of Risperdal
- A guilty plea for misbranding Topamax in 2010
- Guilty pleas to bribery in Europe in 2011 by J+J's DePuy subsidiary
- A guilty plea for marketing Risperdal for unapproved uses in 2011 (see this link for all of the above)
- Accusations that the company, which makes smoking cessation products, participated along with tobacco companies in efforts to lobby state legislators (see post here)
- A guilty plea to misbranding Natrecor by J+J subsidiary Scios (see post here)
- More recently, in 2012, testimony in a trial of allegations of unethical marketing of the drug Risperdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary revealed a systemic, deceptive stealth marketing campaign that fostered suppression of research whose results were unfavorable to the company, ghostwriting, the use of key opinion leaders as marketers in the guise of academics and professionals, and intimidation of whistleblowers. After these revelations, the company abruptly settled the case (see post here).
-  Most recently, there are reports that the company is in negotiation with the US Department of Justice to settle other lawsuits about the marketing of Risperdal, perhaps for as much as $1.8 billion (see this BusinessWeek story.)

Meanwhile, an article from the Wharton Business School suggested that the problems at Johnson and Johnson stemmed directly from former drug representative Weldon's management approach, which put short term revenues, "making the numbers," ahead of everything else, apparently including good manufacturing practices, or ethical business practices:
[University of Michigan Ross School of Business Professor Erik] Gordon argues that CEO Weldon's relentless focus on the bottom line -- the company's website touts its record of 27 consecutive years of adjusted earnings increases and 49 consecutive years of dividend increases -- is the reason for the current woes. 'Bill Weldon sets the priorities and the culture for the company,' says Gordon. And the problems, from overly aggressive marketing to underinvestment in safety and quality systems, reflect 'people trying to get their bonuses, hit their numbers and keep their job.'

No doubt the global economic collapse in 2008 put renewed pressure on managers at multinationals like Johnson & Johnson. John Kimberly -- a Wharton management professor and executive director of the Wharton/INSEAD Alliance who has worked with J&J executives in Europe since the late 1990s -- says he detected a shift among those managers starting in 2008. 'I got the sense that there were some things happening at corporate, and that messages were being sent about the need to deliver profitability,' Kimberly notes. 'It seemed as though the people I was working with were feeling pressure from above to pay closer attention to the bottom line. It was a palpable, tangible change.'

Wharton's Donaldson gives J&J management credit for the aggressive steps the company is now taking to overhaul its manufacturing processes and plants. But he also notes that the balance between profits and patients is a tricky one. Managers at J&J, he says, 'are juggling a lot of balls. In the credo, they say they put patients first and stockholders further down the line. But there is a red ball that every manager knows about, [which is] profit -- and they don't let that red ball drop.' Figuring out how to serve patients well and still deliver for Wall Street is not easy. 'J&J believes they can do both those things,' Donaldson says. 'But if the weight of one side of that formula gets too heavy, the entire structure collapses.'

Summary

The ongoing news from the once proud Johnson and Johnson, whose credo famously states:
We believe our first responsibility is to doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers, and all others who use our products and services. In meeting their needs, everything we do must be of high quality.
suggests that instead, the company's first responsibility is now to the hired managers, to obey their dictates no matter how they undermine the credo, and most importantly, to pay them so much as to make them some of the most wealthy people in the world. Johnson and Johnson has become exemplary, not of putting patients or health care professionals first, but of how hired managers took over health care, and turned it to their own advantage.

So should we trust Johnson and Johnson to do better, now that another former pharmaceutical representative will be its new CEO?

The case of Johnson and Johnson indicates why we need a huge change in how health care organizations are lead.

Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Three Golden Parachutes and Some Unexpected Sequels

Golden parachutes are an always fascinating aspect of executive compensation in health care.  I have collected three relatively recently revealed stories about golden parachutes given to government and non-profit hospital system CEOs, at least two of which involve unexpected, and also fascinating sequels.  They will appear in order of the apparent size of the parachutes.

Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital System

Santa Clara Health and Hospital System is a county (government) system of moderate size in California.  Last week, the compensation given its outgoing CEO in 2010 was revealed by the San Jose Business Journal:
Former Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital System CEO Kim Roberts walked away with an impressive chunk of change when she abruptly left the job in February 2010.

According to a city and county salary report released from the State Controllers Office, the position earned a little over $1 million that year.

A county spokeswoman confirmed that the total included accrued vacation, sick leave and other payments Roberts was entitled to.

The salary was the highest in the Bay Area for public employees in 2010.

Note that
Roberts was hired as CEO in March 2007 with a five-year contract. The agreement included a starting salary of $285,744 with annual salary adjustments, severance and other benefits.

The issue here is that Ms Roberts was the CEO of a local government run health system. Traditionally, the pay given to people in such positions is closely scrutinized by politicians and tax payers, and hence is usually less than that given out by private, non-profit hospital systems, much less for-profit ones. Nonetheless, while it appears that Ms Roberts got something more than $700,000 worth of compensation beyond her usual salary in her last year, the nature of this compensation, and the justification for it is unclear.

Erlanger Health System

The story that got my attention appeared two days ago in the Chattanooga Times-Free Press:
After more than a month of negotiations, Erlanger trustees reversed a previous vote and approved a controversial $728,000 severance package for outgoing CEO Jim Brexler.

Trustees voted 4-4 against the same severance package in December but voted 5-4 to approve it during a 30-minute meeting Monday morning.

More detail about the package:
The approved agreement provides 15 months of severance for Brexler, worth about $713,000. He also keeps his Erlanger health coverage for 18 months, paying his employee portion, a benefit worth about $15,000.

This story is actually a complex sequel. We discussed CEO compensation at Erlanger Health System, an academic medical center affiliated with the University of Tennesse, a year ago. At that time, we noted that a substantial bonus given to then CEO Jim Brexler was based on favorable financial results in the previous year, but did not apparently take into account the more recent decline in the system's finances. That bonus was justified by the typical paean to the leadership's "real expertise in health care" by one member of its board.

By last month, however, Erlanger's finances had deteriorated dramatically. A Free Press article then stated,
Erlanger hospital employees have been asked to take 12 days off in the next two months, consider voluntary buyouts and face possible layoffs as Chattanooga's only public hospital bleeds money.

The hospital has lost more $6 million in the last five months, half of that in November.

The reason for this accelerating misfortune deterioration remain unexplained. Apparently, CEO Brexler had decided to depart, for also unclear reasons, two months earlier:
In October, the hospital announced CEO Jim Brexler would retire at the end of the year.

At that time, the board had voted to give him the severance package described above, but then suddenly began to reconsider after how bad things were became clear:
The board voted earlier this month not to give Brexler a more than $700,000 severance package, but the issue may be brought back up, board members have said.

It was unclear whether the decline in Erlanger's finances had to do with its relationship with another troubled hospital, Hutcheson Medical Center, as described in another Free Press article:
Despite a new board, new management and the infusion of a $20 million line of credit, a struggling North Georgia public hospital continues to lose money.

Erlanger at Hutcheson, formerly known as Hutcheson Medical Center, lost more than $9 million in the first five months of the 2012 fiscal year, which began in July. It lost the most -- $2.7 million -- in September.

Hutcheson board Chairman Corky Jewell could not be reached for comment last week.

The hospital's administrator, Debbie Reeves, and other management personnel were not in the office the week between Christmas and New Year's, according to spokeswoman Haley Johnson.

The publicly funded hospital in Fort Oglethorpe had been losing about $1 million a month, defaulted on a $35 million bond and laid off 75 employees in fiscal year 2011.

In May, Erlanger Health System took over management of the hospital and extended up to $20 million in credit to it.

Apparently inflated compensation to Hutcheson's CEO was also a subject of one of our posts from about a year ago. At that time, we wrote, "despite a major financial loss, lay-offs and service discontinuations, and a bond default," the CEO got "bonus and incentive compensation" in 2009.

So, to summarize, despite major financial problems, Hutcheson Medical Center's CEO got a bonus and incentive compensation in 2009. As its situation got worse, it was taken over in some sense by Erlanger Health System, whose CEO also got a bonus despite increasing financial problems in 2010. Thereafter, the finances of Erlanger really declined, its CEO announced his retirement, and still will collect a golden parachute.

Thus Erlanger Health System's golden parachute for its outgoing CEO symbolizes the anti-gravitational powers of executive compensation. While lavish executive pay is often justified by short-term financial results, health care executives seem to be able to just keep collecting more and more until they have to flee. Health care seems to more and more be run for the benefit of self-interested insiders.

Also, this case demonstrates how skeptical we ought to be of the breathless praise for health care executives and managers and the uncritical touting of their latest advances and initiatives.  (By the way, we posted here, just before it became apparent how badly Erlanger's finances were collapsing, about its breathless advertisement of a "new service excellence program" for Erlanger employees run by the Ritz-Carlton hotel chain.  One wonders whether the attention to the peripheral ahead of core responsibilities this denoted could have been one reason for the system's decline.) 

And we are just working our way up to our big case....

University of Chicago Medical Center

This story actually dates back to 2009, but was first revealed briefly in late 2011, in Becker's Hospital Review,
The other three highest-paid hospital CEOs in Chicago in 2010 include the following:
• James Madara, MD, and Ken Sharigian, University of Chicago Medical Center: $7.9 million
Note: This includes severance for Dr. Madara, who resigned in Oct. 2009. Mr. Sharigian served as the interim in 2010.

A little more detail came out in a side-bar to a story on executive compensation in higher education by the Chronicle of Higher Education:
James L. Madara, dean of the school of medicine and chief executive of the medical center, U. of Chicago
Total compensation: $7,038,944
Mr. Madara’s base salary was $1.3-million, and he received $2.5-million in severance pay.

There was also a hint of why this was so interesting:
Mr. [sic] Madara stepped down after seven years as dean and three as chief executive to return to the faculty. He resigned amid controversy over his management decisions, such as a plan to redirect medical-center patients to neighboring hospitals, according to local news reports.

A little digging shows there was more to it than that. Recall our recent post that discussed the "Urban Health Initiative," a program ostensibly meant to direct some patients, allegedly mainly poor patients, to more appropriate health care venues, allegedly away from the Emergency Department of the university medical center, and again allegedly to make room for patients who need and whose insurance can pay for more lucrative services.

By February, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that
In February, two high-ranking doctors quit their administrative posts to protest the plan, saying it could lengthen already long waiting times for patients who visit the ER.

In particular,
The two doctors who gave up their administrative posts in Chicago were Dr. Vanden Hoek, who stepped down as interim chief of emergency medicine, and pulmonology researcher Joe G.N. Garcia, who had been chairman of medicine. The doctors still can practice medicine at the hospital.

About a dozen other doctors from the emergency room and other departments had signed a letter of protest over the hospital administration's plan to reduce the number of beds available to emergency patients in the ER and other units.

Three months later, as reported by Chicago Business,
Some University of Chicago Medical Center faculty members are accusing CEO James Madara of putting hospital finances ahead of research and teaching.

A letter delivered to Dr. Madaar last month and signed by 76 faculty members asserts that, since adding the hospital CEO title in 2006, Dr. Madara has lost focus on his role as a dean of the Hyde Park medical center's vaunted research and academic enterprise. A preocccupation with hospital profits and an 'insular management style' have 'disenfranchised' the faculty, the letter says.

By that month, according to the Wall Street Journal,
More than 190 doctors at the University of Chicago Medical Center signed a letter to trustees protesting plans to reduce the number of beds available to emergency patients as 'unnecessarily risky' and a threat to patient safety.

The plan was put on hold by the university president a few days later. Dr Madara resigned in August.

So, somewhat like the case above, this involved a hospital system CEO who got a very large golden parachute after leaving under fire, not for declining revenue, but for his role in overseeing a program of questionable ethics, one possibly bad for patients, and having lost the confidence of some important proportion of his medical faculty.

He did not, however, go off quietly into the night. His next stop was Leavitt Partners (as noted in this AMA press release), founded by former President George W Bush administration Secretary for Health and Human Services James Leavitt.

As we noted here, Leavitt Partners advertises that it "advises clients that invest in health care and food safety." It does not publicize its client list, but that list apparently includes Alliance Health Networks, whose press release noted that Leavitt Partners "will help it expand its presence in the US health industry and beyond "(look here); and Connextions, Inc, whose press release noted that it would work with Leavitt Partners to " refine existing health insurance exchange models for federal and state governments, as well as private sector organizations that are navigating health care reform law," (look here.)  Mr Leavitt joined the board of Medtronic last year (look here). 

Then, however, he got back into the CEO business.  While still maintaining a role at Leavitt, in 2011, per the AMA release,
The American Medical Association (AMA) today named James L. Madara, M.D., as its new Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer. Dr. Madara will assume leadership of the nation’s oldest and largest physician group on July 1.

That news release noted his past positions,
the Thompson Distinguished Service Professorship and deanship at the University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine, where he was the longest serving Pritzker dean in the last 35 years. Subsequently, he added the responsibility of CEO of the University of Chicago Medical Center, bringing together the university’s biomedical research, teaching and clinical activities.

Perhaps not surprisingly, it did not mention the controversies at the medical center that preceded his resignation, nor his sizable golden parachute, nor his ongoing role at Leavitt Partners.

So, the American Medical Association claims to represent all US physicians and their values. It turns out that its current Executive Vice President and CEO is a former hospital system CEO who departed under fire with a golden parachute beyond any severance package a practicing or academic physician would dream about.  He also is a former and current consultant with a firm lead by one of our better recent examples of beneficiaries of the revolving door.  We have come a long, and the wrong way since the AMA asserted, "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade." (See this post.)

This story is not just about the ridiculous compensation given to health care executives, and how this provides perverse incentives and suggests that many health care leaders have become insiders who put their self-interest ahead of the health care mission. This story is also about the connectedness of these insiders, and how they appear to control nearly every part of health care.

The Moral of the Stories

Maybe if I write this often enough, it will get some notice.... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times ... for Synthes Executives

The latest news about the Synthes Norian XL bone cement case shows just how bizarre incentives for health care leaders can be. 

The Synthes Case

Synthes USA, the American branch of a Swiss based device company, first settled charges that it had been paying surgeons with company stock to use its products in its clinical trials in 2009 (see this post).  Then prosecutors alleged that these were not really rigorous trials. Instead, for marketing purposes, executives of Synthes subsidiary Norian persuaded surgeons to use its Norian XR product in a case series of spine surgery patients and then publish the results.  Three patients who received the product for this "off-label" use died.  This scheme was alleged to have been directed by "person no. 7," whom journalists identified as the company CEO, Hansjorg Wyss (see post here.)   In an unusual move, the prosecutors indicted four company executives, who then pleaded guilty.  They did not take any further action against Wyss, who turns out to be one of the world's richest men (see post here). 

Executives Sentenced

In late November, three of the executives were sentenced, as per the Philadelphia Inquirer:
Three former executives of medical-device manufacturer Synthes Inc. were sentenced to prison Monday. A fourth might have been if his attorney hadn't collapsed while standing at a lectern moments after saying that Synthes' unindicted board chairman was the ultimate authority and responsible for the illegal, sometimes fatal, bone-cement trial at the center of the proceedings.

Michael Huggins, 54, of West Chester, the former president of Synthes USA, was sentenced to nine months in prison and taken into custody immediately. Thomas Higgins, 55, of Berwyn, former leader of Synthes' spine division, got the same sentence. John Walsh, 48, of Coatesville, who was in charge of regulatory affairs, got five months.

U.S. District Judge Legrome D. Davis gave Higgins two weeks to report to prison so he could arrange for extra medical care for his wife. Davis gave Walsh until next Monday to report because Tuesday is his young daughter's birthday.

The three will pay $100,000 each in fines and be on supervised release after prison. All pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count under the responsible-corporate-officer doctrine.


Richard Bohner, 56, of Malvern, former vice president for operations, was the third of four defendants on Davis' docket Monday and might have gotten a sentence similar to those received by Huggins and Higgins.

No Penalty for the Former CEO

However, there were no penalties for the company CEO who was allegedly "person no. 7":
Hansjorg Wyss, the Synthes board chairman, who also was chief executive officer when the illegal bone-cement trial occurred, was not in the courtroom but still was part of Monday's events.

Gurney, Bohner's attorney, said Wyss was the undisputed leader of the company. 'He made some of the very critical decisions that put the trials on the ultimate pathway,' Gurney said. 'The culture of an organization is set at the top.'

Wyss could not be reached for comment.

Meanwhile, Mr Wyss continues to grow richer. Forbes currently lists him as number 164 on its list of the world's wealthiest people, estimating his assets at $6.4 billion.

A Golden Parachute for the Current CEO

Mr Wyss may be made even more wealthy because US health care corporate giant Johnson and Johnson has agreed to buy Synthes. Furthermore, as also reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer, the current Synthes CEO is in line to also greatly benefit from that deal:
Orsinger is getting $51.9 million for leaving the old company and a multimillion-dollar pay package from the new company. His new base salary of $700,000 will be a cut in pay from his old firm, but he will have some lucrative bonus opportunities. If he can make do clipping coupons for three years, he will get a stock package worth $17.2 million.

Orsinger is the chief executive officer of Synthes Inc., the medical-device manufacturer based in Switzerland but with U.S. headquarters and facilities in West Chester.

Implications

On one hand, up to now, it has been very rare for any top executives of health care corporations to suffer any negative consequences due to ethical missteps by their companies, much less to go to jail. The current case may be the first real example of government prosecutors using the responsible corporate officer doctrine in such a setting. We first discussed this concept here in 2010. As noted in Reuters about the Synthes case,
After decades in relative obscurity, a U.S. legal doctrine that holds corporate officers liable for company wrongdoing is finding its way back into some high-profile healthcare prosecutions.

The 'responsible corporate officer' doctrine allows for prison terms of up to one year for misdemeanor violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, but typically defendants have received only probation.

Recently, however, the government has sought to reinvigorate the doctrine, and some executives are facing stiffer penalties than they had ever imagined.
Why only now has this doctrine been dusted off, when it has been around for over 70 years, and validated by the Supreme Court over 35 years ago, remains unclear.
Does its use now signal the end of health care leaders' impunity? We have noted that despite all sorts of misbehavior leading to a march of legal settlements, almost no one who authorized, directed or implemented the bad behavior within a large health care corporation has ever paid any penalty for it. The penalties for the four Synthes executives are certainly a break in the pattern.

Moreover, while in the Synthes case the executives who pleaded guilty were aware of what was going on, the doctrine allows prosecution of responsible corporate officers who were not so aware. As in the Reuters article,
The principle behind the doctrine was validated by the Supreme Court in 1975, when it affirmed the conviction of John Park, the chief executive of a national food chain who had been charged with allowing warehoused food to be exposed to rodent contamination. The court held that, to convict Park, the jury did not have to find that he was aware of the unsanitary conditions, only that he was in a position of authority to prevent them.

However, in the Synthes case, there was no attempt made to prosecute even more highly placed "responsible corporate officers." As noted above, the past and current CEO were not charged, and meanwhile have engineered a merger that may make them even more wealthy (ironically, with a company, Johnson and Johnson, that has also had a troubled recent record).

Furthermore, as per Reuters, prosecutors are not exactly gung ho about using the responsible corporate doctrine:
Over the next few decades, prosecutors used the doctrine sparingly, concerned that overuse would bring unwanted judicial scrutiny, said Paul Hyman, formerly of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's Chief Counsel's Office and now a director at the law firm of Hyman, Phelps & McNamara.

Also,
The future of the responsible corporate officer doctrine could depend on whether executives who plead guilty under the doctrine are able to find other employment.

Cory Andrews, a lawyer with the Washington Legal Foundation, which filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the Purdue defendants, said that as the severity of penalties increase for misdemeanors, so do the odds of a constitutional challenge.

'Arguably, where the deprivation is very small, the due process violations are not as significant,' Andrews said. 'But where the deprivation goes to someone's ability to earn a living -- I think that raises the constitutional temperature.'

Many of the legal settlements we have discussed involved activities that threatened the safety, health or even lives of patients. But if a corporate executive might not be able to get further lucrative employment as such after participating in such misbehavior, quelle horreur!

Let us hope that government officials, who have been so solicitous in the past about the financial well-being of the health care corporations they are supposed to oversee, will start thinking about the consequences of these corporations' misbehavior for the public to whom those officials are supposed to answer.

I conclude, de rigueur, to really deter bad behavior, those who authorized, directed or implemented bad behavior must be held accountable. As long as they are not, expect the bad behavior to continue. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

A New Low - A Hospital CEO Got a "Golden Parachute" for A Merger that Never Occurred

We recently posted about how top hospital managers are often the first to benefit from mergers and acquisitions, which once again have become fashionable in management circles.  Now it appears that top executives can benefit even from failed mergers, as reported by the Daytona Beach (Florida) News-Journal,
Five months after Bert Fish Medical Center's failed merger, one board member said he was surprised to learn payments are still being made toward the $1 million buyout of the former hospital CEO.

Hospital board member Joe Benedict said he didn't know former hospital Chief Executive Officer Bob Williams, who steered the board into the illegal deal with Adventist Health System, is due to receive his $289,000-a-year salary until 2014 –– paid through the publicly owned hospital.

At the time the merger was announced, a memorandum of understanding with Williams became public and showed the deal had triggered a three-year buyout clause in Williams' contract. Starting July 1, 2010, the Adventist agreement paid him his salary for three years, as his contract required, plus seven months and eight days –– a deal worth $1 million and benefits.

'That man has got away with a lot more than he should have,' said Benedict, a former County Council member, explaining that he considers Williams as responsible for the failed merger as Jim Heekin, the board's former attorney.

These payments were made to the former CEO despite the cost of the failure of the merger:
The hospital district incurred $3.4 million in administrative and legal fees as a result.

Apparently, there are allegations that the merger failed because former CEO Williams agreed to keep the board meetings of this public hospital secret, which was illegal:
The hospital board has voted to pursue a legal malpractice lawsuit against Heekin, of the Orlando firm Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, for his advice to keep the public out of talks about merging the New Smyrna Beach hospital with a partner. The 21 closed meetings that were held over 16 months were called 'so much darkness for so long' they couldn't be cured, according to a ruling earlier this year from Circuit Judge Richard Graham, who threw out the merger.

Also,
Williams is quoted in transcripts of the closed meetings telling board members not to tell anyone Adventist had been chosen as Bert Fish's partner

Other contractual provisions for golden parachutes exist, but have yet to be activated:
Benedict said he's still hopeful he can undo other buyout clauses in hospital contracts he believes obligate the hospital to pay more than is allowed, under state law, for the departure of Bert Fish Medical Center administrators. According to the current contracts, provided to the News-Journal, the hospital's current CEO, chief financial officer and chief of nursing must be paid 24 months' salary should they be dismissed from their positions through no fault of their own. Their departures could be a possibility if Bert Fish were to seek another merger partner who doesn't want to keep them on.

The contracts were executed June 30. On July 1, a new state law went into effect that limits the buyout of public employees to 20 months.

Summary

So, a hospital CEO had a contract that made him eligible to begin receiving "golden parachute" payments just because a merger was in process, and these payments could not be stopped even though the merger was declared illegal, and hence never occurred. We noted recently that CEOs and other top officials of health care organizations are often the first to benefit financially from mergers and acquisitions, even when such transactions to not prove so beneficial to the affected institutions, much less patients' and the public's health in the long run. Here is a case in which a CEO could get extra money just because a merger was contemplated. This is some sort of new record for health care leaders personally profiting from their insider positions.

There has been growing public outrage about how ordinary people who play by the rules are disadvantaged in today's economy, while insiders profit from their positions. There ought to be equal outrage in health care over its version of this pheonomenon.

As long as health care leaders can continue to put their self-interest ahead of the health care mission in this way, is it any wonder that health care costs continue to rise while access and quality suffer? When will would be health care reformers realize that to truly reform health care, we will have to reform health care leadership? We need health care leaders who understand and uphold the mission, are accountable for how well they do so, and whose incentives depend on how they do so. We do not need leaders who put their self-interest first. Right now, however, that seeems to be the leadership we have.

More Executives Prospering Despite the Financial Distress of their Hospitals

Cases that demonstrate the contrast between compensation given to the hired executives of health care organizations and their or their organizations' performance continue to appear.  Last week we discussed how freely million dollar plus compensation is given to executives of nominally non-profit hospitals, and discussed how well some executives were paid just prior to charges of financial mismanagement, arrests or guilty pleas that drove them from their jobs.

I have also found a series of cases of executives whose pay seemed disproportionate in the context of their institutions' financial difficulties.  Here they are, discussed in alphabetical order.

Greenwich Hospital, Connecticut

According to GreenwichTime.com, here is the context:
Greenwich Hospital went under the knife on Wednesday, announcing the layoffs of 36 employees and a series of cutbacks to what it characterized as non-core programs to offset the loss of revenue from a newly implemented state hospital tax.

A Yale-New Haven Health System affiliate and the town's largest employer, the hospital estimated it needs to make up for $8.5 million in lost revenue.

The hospital's top administrator blamed the situation on the state, which now gets a 4.6 percent cut of all hospital income as part of a flat tax enacted on July 1.

While the CEO announced cuts in services, he was not about to cut his own compensation:
'If they're doing so much cost-cutting, what are they doing about [hospital CEO Frank] Corvino's $1.5 million salary?' [former town first selectman Richard] Bergstresser said. 'It seems to me that they should do some trimming before they do layoffs.'

Note that a hospital public relations official had the usual explanation:
Yale New Haven Health System uses a third-party consultant to gauge executive compensation levels, according [hospital spokesman George]Pawlush, who said that Corvino wears two hats.

In addition to his duties as hospital president and chief executive, Corvino is executive vice president of Yale New Haven Health System.

'Each organization contributes half of Frank's total earnings,' Pawlush said. 'Frank's experience in hospital administration has given him the skills needed to successfully balance both of these highly demanding roles simultaneously.'
So in summary, the CEO of a hospital forced to make lay-offs and close popular programs was paid more than $1 million a year because of his great "skills."
Hoboken University Medical Center (HUMC), New Jersey

The context here is a bit complicated. First, according to the Jersey Journal,
The Hoboken hospital was ... in a sea of debt when it was called St. Mary Hospital. In early 2008 the city took over the hospital and its $52 million debt, but the city has never sought to remain in the business of running a hospital.

So,
The HMHA, the board that oversees the operations and sale of the HUMC, is in exclusive negotiations with HUMC Holdco, whose proposal was chosen over seven others last month.

As negotiations about the sale of the distressed hospital continued, the Jersey Journal then reported,
the hospital's manager, Hudson Healthcare Inc., recently declared bankruptcy. Earlier this week, HMHA Chairperson Toni Tomarazzo said that declaring bankruptcy was a necessary step in facilitating the sale,

However, just before then, as a reporter from the Newark Star-Ledger found out,
Less than three weeks before the operator of the city-owned Hoboken University Hospital filed for bankruptcy — putting millions of dollars in taxpayer money and union pension funds at risk — the hospital’s chief executive received a six-figure payout, records show.

Spiros Hatiras, 46, stepped down as chief executive on July 16 after two years on the job with a severance package that includes $600,000 in compensation and full medical benefits for a year, according to records obtained under the Open Public Records Act.

In addition,
A physical therapist who rose through the hospital’s ranks, Hatiras was earning a $400,000 a year and incentive bonuses at the time of his resignation, records show; his contract was set to expire in five months, and called for a severance payment only in the event the hospital terminated the contract.

The package was negotiated by Hudson Healthcare Inc., the current operator of the hospital that filed for bankruptcy protection, and was approved by the Hoboken Municipal Hospital Authority.

Initially, no one could come up with a clear explanation. First,
Doug Petkus, a spokesman for the authority, said officials 'cannot' comment on the issue.

Then, the Hoboken mayor made this attempt, per the Jersey Journal,
Asked why the HMHA decided to give Hatiras the generous severance even though it didn't have to, Mayor Dawn Zimmer, also an HMHA commissioner, skirted the question.

'Given the totality of the circumstances, this was the best way to save our hospital and relieve our taxpayers of a $52 million bond guarantee.

Asked if that meant the sale of the hospital was contingent upon Hatiras receiving the lucrative severance, Zimmer said 'Given the totality of the circumstances, this was the best way to save our hospital and relieve our taxpayers of a $52 million bond guarantee.'

Finally, the Jersey Journal reported this version:
The Hoboken Municipal Hospital Authority (HMHA) was obligated to pay out a $600,000 severance package to the former Hoboken University Medical Center CEO because he met the conditions of his contract for the lucrative parting gift, according to HMHA chairwoman Toni Tomarazzo.

Tomarazzo refuted stories that appeared in The Jersey Journal, Star-Ledger, and online at NJ.com that said the HMHA, the city entity that runs the hospital, was not bound to pay Spiro Hatiras the severance amount because he resigned.

Hatiras’ contract called for payment of the severance package 'upon termination, non-renewal or expiration of the term of Employment Agreement,' according to the HMHA resolution authorizing payment.

'It was a contractual obligation,' Tomarazzo said. 'There was nothing we could do about it.'

The resolution said 'even though the employment ended through a mutual agreement to step aside and cease to serve as CEO that shall be documented in a resignation letter...' the HMHA agreed that Hatiras 'is entitled to' the severance package.
So, in summary, the CEO of  a public hospital deeply in debt, and which had to be sold to a for-profit corporation, received a substantial golden parachute just prior to its operating authority's bankruptcy filing.  The only explanation was that this payment was a contractual obligation, which, of course, begged some questions: knowing that the hospital was in a perilous financial condition, why did the authority write such severance into the contract, and if it did not intend that severance should be paid under the conditions which finally obtained, why is the authority not disputing the payments?

Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, New York

According to the New York Post, here is the context.
The 326-bed facility is considered one of five Brooklyn hospitals that advocates fear is in danger of being shuttered by Gov. Cuomo's medical redesign team. Many of Kingsbrook's patients are Medicaid recipients.

Furthermore, in 2009,
the hospital was forced to close a clinic and lay off workers and staff members took furloughs because of budget tightening.

However,
hospital officials defended Brady's compensation, noting she was paid $1,094,443 in base salary in 2009 - and that $2,891,335 will be doled out as retirement and deferred compensation she accumulated from 30 years of service.


Brady also received $215,241 in bonuses and nontaxed benefits in 2009.

The Post asserted that her total compensation of over $4 million was "more than any other nonprofit hospital executive in the state."

Her previous two years' compensation was slightly more modest, but still greater than the magic $1 million a year:
In 2008, Brady took home $1,054,406 in base pay plus an additional $137,335 in deferred compensation and nontaxable benefits, tax records show.

In 2007, she hauled in $1,023,452 in base salary plus $195,661 in deferred compensation, the records show.

The chairman of the hospital board's finance committee offered the usual rationalization:
'Dr. Brady's compensation is, in fact, at market rate and reflects the board's full faith in her abilities and execution of her job,' said Ed Lieberstein, chairman of the Kingsbrook board of trustees' finance committee.
So, in summary, the CEO of a small non-profit hospital threatened with closure and forced to lay-off workers and close programs was paid over $4 million, supposedly the "market rate."  One wonders if the "market" here was that including small, financially distressed hospitals?

MetroHealth Medical Center, Ohio

This public, not for profit Cleveland, Ohio health care system has had its share of troubles lately, as the Cleveland Plain Dealer noted,
MetroHealth, the county's safety-net hospital, has faced a myriad of economic hurdles and is still undergoing what its leaders call a turnaround: The system reported a $2.2 million loss on net income in 2007. It continued to bleed money in early 2008, losing $11 million in the first quarter, according to long-time trustee and now MetroHealth Board Chair Ron Fountain.

So, when a new CEO, Mark Moran, was hired to turn the system around, per the Plain Dealer,
'At MetroHealth, starting in 2008, we turned over every chief -- the chief financial officer, chief executive, chief operating officer, chief medical officer, everybody,' said MetroHealth board member Thomas McDonald, who has been on the voluntary board since March 2008. 'We had to get the ship righted.'

While doing so, however, the new leadership saw fit to reward those it pushed out the door,
The MetroHealth System has agreed to pay more than $4 million for consulting contracts in lieu of severance to top executives and high-level employees who have left the county-owned hospital since 2008.

The contracts, similar to the one the hospital granted to departing Chief Financial Officer Sharon Kelley, have provided salary and benefits, in some cases up to one year, to dozens of departing employees. The deals also include up to $114,000 in performance bonuses for three executives.

The agreements allow for continued accrual of vacation pay benefits and continued contributions to the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System. The work required of employees under the contracts is not specified.

CEO Moran later acknowledged that the "consulting agreements" really did not require any consulting to be done, again in the Plain Dealer,
Awarding what Moran called 'employee transition contracts' lowered the risk of potential litigation and provided access to the institutional knowledge of the departing employees. He acknowledged, however, that most of the employees 'probably didn't' do any work.

Mr Moran explained the need for such severance packages thus:
the amount MetroHealth pays its executives, including severance, is necessary to compete against the Cleveland Clinic and University Hospitals for qualified professionals.

However, MetroHealth was not exactly competing to keep these executives, it was trying to get them to leave.

Furthermore, while the health care system has just gotten beyond its financial distress, the compensation given to its current executives has surged ahead, again according to the Plain Dealer,
The pay packages of MetroHealth System's top-tier executives -- base salary plus potential incentives -- ranks near the top 25 percent when compared to that of similarly sized health systems, according to a report by a national compensation adviser.

The report, completed in April and provided to The Plain Dealer last week, provides an inside-look at the way MetroHealth pays 18 executives when county leaders and the public have questioned the spending practices of the county-owned health system.

MetroHealth hired Mercer, as it has for at least four years, to review the system's executive-level pay and severance policy to determine if they were in line with industry averages.

What Mercer found this year was a staff with "more competitive pay levels than has historically been the case" -- including one salary so high that the firm suggested a review of whether it was "reasonable."

That concerned one board member,
MetroHealth board member John Moss, who reviewed the report for the first time late last week, called it "disconcerting." He was particularly bothered by the salaries, saying the health system's administration had told the board that the compensation was "closer to the middle."

"They seem to be closer to the top 25 percentile," Moss said. "[It's] not what we've been told."

Can anyone guess the justification for the lucrative payments given by the CEO?
Moran goes on to write that the contracts 'support our ability to recruit the best and brightest talent.'
So, in summary, many executives of a public hospital that had been in financial distress were discharged, but given large "consulting payments" which appeared to be golden parachutes.  The new executives were paid at very high rates compared to some sort of market because they were "the best and the brightest."
Summary

So we see more cases of executive exceptionalism.  The hired executives of health care organizations, including non-profit and public hospitals, seem to prosper financially regardless of their organizations' financial status.  The executives, their boards of trustees and the hospitals' own hired public relations staff may justify the financial success of their leaders by referring to "market" conditions, which do not seem to be references to "markets" consisting of financially troubled hospitals, and by praising their leaders' abilities, including literally calling them "the best and the brightest," without any obvious evidence supporting their claims.

To an outsider, it just seems like the hospitals are now run primarily for the financial benefit of their hired leaders.  The problems seem to be:

-  Paying the leaders so well (and supporting the public relations staff who sing their praises) costs money that could better be used to provide actual health care.

-  Providing such perverse incentives, which seem entirely unrelated to the hospitals' ability to uphold their primary patient care  and public health missions (and academic mission if applicable), is likely to detract from the hospitals' ability to support these missions.

-  It is likely that employees of such institutions who actually try to uphold the mission will be demoralized by the realization that their leaders' enrichment comes first, further damaging the hospitals' ability to uphold the mission.

-  Finally, it is possible that such perverse incentives attract leaders who are particularly unsuited to the task of upholding the mission.

One cannot help but notice that the quaint notion that hospitals exist to uphold patient care, public health, or academic missions rarely is acknowledged nowadays in discussion of hospital leadership.

Turning blue in the face, I say again... Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Being a Non-Profit Hospital CEO Means Never Having to Say You Are Sorry

When my arm was twisted heartily to see the movie "Love Story" a very long time ago, I could never understand why so many audience members sighed upon hearing that immortal line, "love means never having to say you're sorry."  I could not understand it then, and still cannot.

However, it seems that for reasons that are not any more clear, being the CEO of a not-for-profit hospital or hospital system also means never having to say you are sorry, as shown in some recent stories from the media.

Not Sorry for Leaving

Originally published in the Fargo (ND) InForum:
The merger 1½ years ago of Sanford Health and MeritCare created a new entity that doubled in size and covers a service area of more than 130,000 square miles.

But the unified health care giant needed only one top executive, and the departing chief administrator received a $1 million contract buyout, according to documents obtained by The Forum.

Dr. Roger Gilbertson, a neuroradiologist who had served as MeritCare’s top executive since its founding 17 years earlier, received a 'separation payment' provided by his contract of $1,000,920, according to a report Sanford filed with the Internal Revenue Service that recently became available.

Not only did Dr Gilbertson not have to say he was sorry for leaving, he collected what amounted to a million dollar plus bonus just for going out the door.

Not Sorry for Leaving Amidst Financial Losses

A long story in the Atlanta Journal Constitution discussed compensation for a number of Atlanta area hospital and hospital system CEOs.  For example,
Edward Bonn of Southern Regional Health System, which operates Southern Regional Medical Center and two affiliated facilities, made $2,610,175 in fiscal 2009. Bonn left the system that year and received his pay of $421,822 plus $2.2 million from a retirement plan. Hospital CEOs commonly receive extra pay from retirement plans when they leave.

Bonn did not receive a bonus because the hospital system lost $12 million that year, the hospital said.

Mr Bonn apparently did not need to say he was sorry for collecting over $2 million when that amount was equal to about one-sixth of his system's yearly loss.

Not Sorry for Financial Losses Plus a "Culture of Entitlement"

This story was in the Peterborough (NH) Examiner:
Former Peterborough Regional Health Centre CEO Paul Darby was given at least $340,126 plus benefits as a financial package after his retirement in December 2009.


He didn't work a single day or offer a single service in 2010 while earning the second top salary at PRHC, just behind current CEO Ken Tremblay.

'The compensations with Paul were in line with similar arrangements with other CEOs and other public hospitals which include support to the executive following the employment period,' board chairwomen Barb Cameron said. 'It is important that we are able to make transitions between leaders smoothly and these kinds of arrangements with the executive allow us to do that.'

Darby retired before a whirlwind of controversy hit the hospital last year including a scathing peer-review report blaming hospital top brass for a 'culture of entitlement' leading to spiraling, cumulative debt.


When Darby left, the hospital faced a growing deficit of just under $25 million.

He was paid $364,275 in 2009, $310,983 in 2008 and $269,419 in 2007.
At least his severance package was less than one-sixth of the deficit.
Not Sorry for Not Even Revealing One's Salary

Here is a local Rhode Island story reported by WPRI:
The nonprofit group that runs three Rhode Island Hospitals including Women & Infants won’t say whether its new chief executive will receive a seven-figure pay package that matches his predecessor’s.

Care New England tapped Cambridge Health Alliance CEO Dennis Keefe as its new president and CEO this week. He will succeed John Hynes, who is retiring, in August.

Care New England spokeswoman May Kernan said the organization would not release details about Keefe’s compensation. 'Other than complying with public reporting requirements as part of the federal [IRS] 990 forms, we do not disclose personal salary information,' she told WPRI.com in an email.

Hynes’ compensation totaled $1.5 million in 2008-09, up from $873,332 in 2007-08, tax records show.
Note that the hired executives of big for-profit corporations also are increasingly uncomfortable about public discussion of their compensation (see this post).
Where All CEOs Are Above Average

The rationales presented for such apparently exceptional treatment given non-profit hospital CEOs (and other hired health care managers) are those we have heard before.

The most prominent rationale for exceptional treatment of an individual CEO is that he (or rarely she) was such an exceptional leader. This would be more believable if it was not used so often, suggesting that those who defend these leaders, often including the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, believe all hospital CEOs, like the mythical children of Lake Woebegone, are above average.

For example, the InForum article provided this explanation of Dr Gilbertson's compensation:
The only comment Sanford provided The Forum was a statement about Gilbertson’s contributions to MeritCare over his long tenure.

'Dr. Gilbertson’s gift to this region is invaluable – 30 years in medicine and 17 years as President/CEO of MeritCare only glance the surface,' said Andrew Richberg, a Sanford executive vice president. 'His vision for health care integration, medical knowledge and dedication to patients made him a pillar in our industry.'

Gilbertson’s legacy, Richberg added, is 'strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people, in their hometowns, all across the region.'

While the article did not suggest Dr Gilbertson's leadership was poor, it is hard to believe that he alone was responsible for "strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people ... all across the region." I am sure there are many other health care professionals in North Dakota who have worked for many years, and who have a strong vision, good medical knowledge, and dedication to patients.  I am sure almost none got $1 million severance packages.  If health care in North Dakota is really that good, is that not because of a lot of hard work by a lot of health care professionals?

The rationale of exceptional treatment for exceptional individuals would also be more believable if it was not used to defend CEOs whose organization performed poorly under their leadership. For example, in the Peterborough Examiner:
'I would like to acknowledge that these are big salaries, but they are big positions in a large hospital involving large responsibilities and requiring unique skills,' [hospital board of trustees chairwoman] Cameron said,....

Would not having the large responsibility for a large deficit argue against a large severance package?

The Market Made Us Do It

Despite substantial evidence and strong arguments (see here) that health care cannot approach being an ideal free market, another favorite rationale for CEO exceptionalism is that the market made us do it. For example, per the AJC:
The number of people who can manage these facilities is limited and recruitment is competitive, [Georgia Hospital Association President Joseph] Parker said.

Qualified leaders will gravitate to other fields over time if compensation for nonprofit CEOs is decreased, [executive search consulting company Mercer Inc partner Jose] Pagoaga said. The 'substandard leadership' that replaces them will degrade the quality of medical care for the community.

There’s debate on the issue.

It’s hard to believe that people who choose the field of charitable medical care would leave because they make only $800,000 a year instead of $1.5 million, said Mark Rukavina, executive director of the Access Project, a Boston patient advocacy organization.

But Pagoaga said nonprofit hospitals cannot count on their charitable duty to attract and retain the best administrators.

'Yes, it’s a social mission, but this is not the priesthood and these people have not taken a vow of poverty,' he said. 'You can’t discount the views of people that look at this as an altruistic mission and think that pay should therefore be limited. All I’m saying is there is an entirely different point of view based on free-market principles.'

In the real world, of course, poverty would hardly be defined as an income less than $1 million a year. Mr Pagoaga never explicated the point of view based on "free-market principles," but I wonder if it can be summarized as "greed is good?"  It would be interesting to see how Mr Pagoaga could explain how health care is like unto an ideal free market.  

Non-Profit Organizations are Not Very Different from For-Profit

Perhaps the most intriguing argument was found in the AJC article:
Pay in excess of $1 million a year may seem high for an organization subsidized by taxpayers, but hospital executives and industry representatives said the public should think of these hospitals not as charities, but as complex, billion-dollar organizations.

Georgia hospitals report to 27 state and federal agencies and engage in multimillion-dollar building projects. The larger hospital systems have billions in revenue and are among the largest employers in their communities. Many also operate for-profit subsidiaries.

'You can’t lose sight of the fact that it’s not an ice cream shop on the side of the street,' said Joseph Parker, president of the Georgia Hospital Association.
Note that currently US non-profit organizations do not have to report much data on their for-profit subsidiaries.  The above argument suggests they deserve considerably more scrutiny.
Of course, that last explanation begs the question of why the compensation of for-profit hired executives should be even higher, with CEO compensation often well more than two orders of magnitude, that is, hundreds of times higher than that of the lowest paid also hired employees (see this post).

Summary

I submit that non-profit hospitals and hospital systems do have a "social mission," which ought to be upheld by their leadership. Despite the rationales supplied above, the leaders ought to be accountable, which may sometimes mean having to say they are sorry.

As I have repeated endlessly,... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

What Is to Be Done?

Based on our ever enlarging file of cases on compensation of the top hired managers of non-profit health care organizations, let me make some concrete suggestions, based on my humble opinion.

A step forward would be to make the finances and compensation arrangements of health care non-profit organizations at least as transparent as those of large public for-profit organizations. So my big idea is:

- Non-profit health care organizations above a reasonable threshold size should provide prompt, public, annual reports analogous and very similar to the reports required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission of public, for-profit companies.

These reports should include, at a minimum, a summary of financial and operational status, an audited financial report, an explanation and accounting for any for-profit subsidiaries and any interlocking non-profit organizations, the compensation given to the CEO and some minimum number of the top-paid officers and employees, a detailed explanation and rationale for the pay of these individuals, and a listing of other affiliations and all conflicts of interest affecting them.

If need to supply such information causes non-profit health care organizations' hired executives and boards of trustees some cognitive dissonance, that would be a good thing. 

The Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO's Golden Parachute - "'Have's' Greasing One Another's Pockets"

We have frequently discussed the kind of compensation now frequently given to leaders of health care organizations.  Although often even the most disproportionately outrageous compensation only attracts transient interest, a recent regional story in this genre has really gotten legs.

How Big the Golden Parachute?
The story was about the severance package given to one Cleve L Killingsworth, the former CEO of not-for-profit health care insurance company Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield.  While first reported as being worth $8.6 million,(1) the estimate of his total severance was soon raised to $11 million.(2)

This is a Way to Control Costs?

Immediately, that amount was contrasted with the supposed emphasis of the company on controlling costs, and its recent poor performance:
Killingsworth’s tenure at Blue Cross, which has nearly 3 million members, was marked by efforts to address skyrocketing medical costs by launching a 'global payment' pilot program, under which health care providers are given an annual budget and incentives to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital.

'Without Cleve’s leadership, we wouldn’t be where we are today in shifting from fee-for-service to global payments,' said senior vice president Jay McQuaide.

But the insurer stumbled financially in recent years, recording back-to-back operating losses totaling nearly $215 million in 2009 and 2010 as the economy weakened and state regulators acted to limit premium increases for policies covering small businesses and individuals.(3)
Then focus shifted to the company's board of trustees, which lead to recognition of some more striking contrasts. First, some prominent members of the board which approved the huge golden parachute had been vocal supporters of controlling health care costs:
Key members of the Blue Cross Blue Shield board that gave the nod to then-CEO Cleve Killingsworth’s controversial $11 million severance have been public advocates for trimming soaring health-care costs — even as they sat on a panel that quietly approved the departing chief’s golden parachute.

Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce President Paul Guzzi has crusaded to lower health-care costs in his day job representing the interests of local businesses, many of which struggle under the burden of rising premiums for their employee health plans.

'Advancing payment reform to bring health-care costs under control' is one of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce’s top policy agenda items, Guzzi said in a statement in January. Guzzi made $84,463 as the Blue Cross board chairman at the time of the Killingsworth vote.

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO who made $72,700 as a Blue Cross board member in 2010, has championed health-care cost reduction for the thousands of union members he represents.

'Unions stand ready to be part of the solution to the health-care cost crisis in which we all find ourselves,' Haynes said in an AFL-CIO statement in January. 'The only way to ensure we are part of the solution is to guarantee that we have a voice and meaningful role in how cost savings are achieved.'

Bentley University president Gloria Larson, who earned $76,400 as a Blue Cross board member last year, helped organize a confab of business, labor and political leaders in Ashland in January that addressed rising health-care costs. Those who planned to attend reportedly included two other Blue Cross board members — Haynes and former Suffolk District Attorney Ralph C. Martin II.(4)
Why Pay a Non-Profit's Trustees?

Also, as the quote above pointed out, it appears that the board members were themselves paid fairly well for a very part-time job, even though in general trustees of not-for-profit organizations serve as unpaid volunteers. However, it was soon revealed the paying board members is common practice for all Massachusetts non-profit health insurance companies.(5)

Some Blue Cross board members tried to defuse the issue by minimizing the impact of their pay on the organization's total budget:
Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and a critic of excessive corporate pay, was questioned about his role on the board following a State House news conference he held on a union-backed plan aimed at lowering health care costs. He said he would not give up his $72,000 annual payment from Blue Cross until the issue was reviewed by the company, and said the money given to board members does not play a role in rising health care costs.

'The cost of health insurance is not affected very much,' Haynes said. 'It’s about $1 million that board members get paid. On $13 billion in revenue, it’s like pennies a year.' (6)
What Should the New CEO Be Paid?
However, soon the board felt the need to suddenly stop paying itself.(7) The current Blue Cross CEO noted how little he would be paid:
Dreyfus emphasized that he has taken 'rock-bottom-of-the-market' compensation levels -- $800,000 in base pay with the opportunity for $1.6 million in severance – for comparable positions in the insurance industry.

'I will be one of the lowest paid Blue Cross executives in the country,' he said.... (8)
Things are tough all over.

What is Mr Killingsworth Now Up To?

Meanwhile, Mr Killingsworth seems to be weathering the storm. An enterprising reporter attempted to interview him in his house in New York, described as "a sprawling clapboard monstrosity with the charm of an assisted-living facility." However, "Mr Killingsworth was nowhere to be found," and Mrs Killingsworth "slammed the door" on the reporter.  (See picture in cited article.)  (9)

Possibly, Mr Killingworth was away tending his other responsibilities, which include serving on the Boards of Directors of The Traveler's Company and TIAA-CREF, and apparently despite their apparently competitive nature, on the boards of the Harvard Medical School and Boston University.

The Reaction

There were plenty of reactions, mostly vigorously unfavorable, to the contrast between the company's non-profit status, supposed commitment to reducing costs, and financial performance, on one hand, and the compensation given to executives, and board members:

"undermines the credibility of insurers when they say they're serious about bringing down the cost of care" Deidre Cummings, President of the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (3)

"If you lose $149 million and then you get paid $11 million for doing it, it is very clear to people where their health-care dollars are going.  And it is not to health care." - Ethan Rome, Health Care for America Now (2)

There were also judgments that health care had become the sandbox for wealthy and well-connected insiders, at the expense of everyone else:

"What we have here today is yet another enraging story of the 'haves'greasing one another's pockets while the 'have-nots' slip beneath the waves." Margery Egan, columnist for the Boston Herald(10)

"Therein lies the problem with boards.  They're supposed to provide oversight, but too often it's the same people tossing money at each other to serve on the boards of each other's companies, the operative word always being 'Yes!'" Brian McGrory, Boston Globe columnist (5)

Most pessimistically:

"If Massachusetts is the model, then national health care reform is ultimately doomed." Derrick Z Jackson, Boston Globe columnist (11)

I am actually now more optimistic.  The coverage of this story really shows that the anechoic effect may be fading .  There is starting to be frank discussion of the role of bad leadership of health care organizations as a cause of health care dysfunction.  If we start to admit these problems, maybe we can figure out solutions.

I will add just one opinion to those expressed in these articles.  The clear problem here is again perverse incentives.  The issue with how much this CEO was paid, and how his board members were paid was not mainly the diversion from direct health care of the funds involved.  Instead, the concerns ought to be: what sorts of people do these payments attract?  Are they the sorts of people who will uphold the organization's mission?  Once attracted, what sorts of incentives do the prospects of these payments supply for what sorts of decisions?  Do these sorts of incentives lead to decisions that uphold the mission in the long-term?

In this case, these concerns are underlined by the Blue Cross trustees' cavalier attitude to their own pay, and the new CEO's belief that $800,000 a year is "rock-bottom." 

I hope that the amount of discussion this case provoked might actually lead to some needed regional changes.

More globally, as we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

References


1.  Gil G. Former Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m last year.  Boston Globe, March 1, 2011. 
2. McConville C. Ex-Blue Cross CEO walks away with $11M. Boston Herald, March 2, 2011.
3. Weisman R. Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m in exit deal. Boston Globe, March 2, 2011.
4. McConville C, Chabot H. Trio publicly crusade against rising health costs: behind the shield. Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
5. McGrory B. Such health pay, it's sick. Boston Globe, March 4, 2011.
6. Levenson M, Weisman R. 2 Blue Cross directors justify stipends. March 8, 2011.
7. Crimaldi L, Dwinnell J. Blue Cross board suspends pay, CEO perks cut. Boston Herald, March 8, 2011.
8. Cheney K. Amid outrage, Blue Cross chief fights to 'reclaim' company's standing. Enterprise News, March 10, 2011.
9. Gelzinis P. Cleve Killingsworth's New York castle not shielded from bad taste. Boston Herald, March 11, 2011.
10. Egan M. You call this health care? - it's nauseating.  Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
11.  Jackson DZ. No wonder health costs are so high.  Boston Globe, March 5, 2011.