The Case of the Vanishing Graduate Medical Education Funds

While primary care falters in the US, those who teach it seem to feel increasingly poverty stricken.  Now it appears that one reason for this is an amazing example of multiple failures of transparency and accountability.  Let me work through it, begging your pardon for a little bit of "inside baseball," medical education style.  The results suggest how we desperately need some medical disciples of Sherlock Holmes.

Background

My personal experience and increasing data suggests that most medical school faculty believe that their teaching is not valued by their institutions because teaching brings in no external funds.  In 2004, Dr Catherine DeAngelis, then the editor of JAMA, wrote "few medical schools provide adequate, if any, reimbursement for teaching time."(1)  (See this 2005 post.)   This seems absurd on its face, since what are medical schools for if it is not to provide teaching. 

However, there is evidence of this mission-hostile behavior.  In 2007, we quoted from a revealing interview with Dr Lee Goldman, Executive Vice President for Health and Biomedical Sciences at Columbia University,(2) who stated that "taxpayers," faculty who "generate more [money] than they cost," are valued most, and implied that faculty who focus on teaching are regarded as "welfare recipients," who bring in less external funding, and are valued least.  In 2010, we noted the results of a large-scale survey presented by Dr Linda Pololi in which 51% of faculty felt that the administration only valued them for the money that they brought in, and half felt that their institutions did not value teaching.(3)

Yet while faculty seem to believe that educational institutions receive little if any money to pay for teaching, it is not clear why the believe something so counter intuitive, and it is less clear what money actually goes to pay for medical education.

US Government Funding for Graduate Medical Education

However, several recent publications affirm that actually a lot of money goes towards one important form of medical education, yet the specifics of the money flows are shrouded in secrecy.  In the May, 2012, SGIM Forum, Dr Mark Liebow and colleagues summarized some of what is known about federal support of graduate medical education, that is, education of interns, residents, and other house officers.(4)  There are two streams of money that flow from Medicare to US hospitals:

Direct GME (DGME) payments help hospitals pay the salaries of residents, teaching faculty, and support staff. DGME is the product of three numbers: a per resident amount that varies by hospital, adjusted annually for inflation; the number of residents in the hospital (capped for each hospital at 1997 levels); and the fraction of discharges from the hospital that are Medicare beneficiaries. The Indirect Medical Education (IME) payment is a percentage amount added on to each DRG payment. The percentage is calculated via a complex formula (the only US statute containing an exponent!), where the key factor is the ratio of interns/residents to beds (IRB ratio).

These two streams are of considerable size:

Of the $9.2 billion Medicare paid for GME in 2010, $3 billion was for DGME and $6.2 billion for IME. The money is paid to hospitals sponsoring training programs rather than to the training programs or other hospitals where training occurs. While about 1,100 hospitals receive GME payments, 66% goes to the 200 hospitals that have the largest numbers of residents.

So, the 200 largest hospitals get about $2 billion in direct GME money (and presumably about another $4 billion in indirect money). This averages then to about $10 million DGME and $20 million indirect GME per hospital.

Thus, teaching, at least the teaching of interns, residents, and other house-staff does pay, and much more than trivial amounts. (Note that these amounts are not for teaching of medical students, which ought to be supported by other funding streams.)

Why then do faculty think that teaching does not bring in any money?

The GME Money Vanishes

An article by Dr Saima I Chaudhry and colleagues in the American Journal of Medicine begins to explain, although the explanations are found between the lines.(5)

First of all, while the graduate medical education money is paid by the government to the hospitals, the government does not publish what it pays to individual hospitals:

It has been previously reported that the amount of GME funding individual hospitals receive is not publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,....

The government also does not hold the hospitals accountable for how they spend this money, nor for the quantity or quality of education they supply in exchange for it.

Remarkably, Chaudhry et al imply that that the people who run graduate medical education teaching programs also may not know how much money their hospitals receive from the government to fund their programs. The introduction to their article noted:

It is unclear how much program directors know about the amount and flow of DME funds to their programs. Program directors' beliefs about the transparency of funding to their programs, or their desire to influence how funds are distributed to them, also are unknown.

The article reported on a survey of internal medicine residency program directors which asked about "their knowledge of D[G]ME funding for their programs, the transparency with which funds are distributed to them, and their desire to influence this disbursement." The researchers sent surveys to 372 member programs, representing 97.1% of all US internal medicine residencies. They got 268 responses, a 72.0% response rate.

The main results were that only 159/268 (59.3%) of program directors had tried to find out how much DGME money their programs received, and of those, only 84 (52.8% of those enquiring, but only 31.3% of all respondents) actually knew how much money their programs got.

Of the 92 program directors who did not even try to discover how much money their programs received, approximately 21% said that "no one would tell me," 21% said that the "information would be inaccurate," 14% said they "don't know who to ask," and 2% were "afraid to ask."

Summary

US medical school faculty, especially those in primary care, increasingly feel pressured to perform activities that they perceive brings in money from external sources. They tend to believe that their own teaching somehow does not bring in any money, and that their careers will fail if they do not put more emphasis on other activities that the institution views as more profitable.

However, literally billions of US government dollars go to support the education of house staff, including the salaries of faculty who teach interns and residents, who probably are the majority of physician faculty. Faculty probably do not know this, because the government does not publish the amounts given to individual hospitals, nor demand of the hospitals any accountability for how they spend the money they receive.

Presumably, the top executives of each hospital know how much money the government gives them. Nonetheless, the majority of physician leaders of residency programs are never told these amounts, apparently because their hospital executives kept the amounts secret. Many of those educators who have tried to find out the figures were unsuccessful. Some did not even try to find out based on beliefs that their attempts would be unsuccessful, any amounts they discovered would be inaccurate, the people who knew the amounts were hidden, or that it would be dangerous to their careers to even try.

Thus billions of dollars of money flowing from the government to fund graduate medical education seems to have vanished in an amazing example of widespread deficiencies in accountability and transparency.

There are many people who blame government for many social ills. In this case, one can blame the US Congress for not writing a law that makes the money flows transparent and hospitals accountable for providing good educational value for the money provided. One can also blame the executive branch, particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for not making the money flows and the values received for them transparent.

There are a few people, including this author, who also blame the leadership of health care organizations for many of the problems besetting health care. In this case, one can blame top leadership, presumably CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of hospitals for hiding the amounts of money they receive from Medicare to finance graduate medical education. One can also blame the physician leaders of residency programs for not insisting that they know the true sources of financial support for their programs, obtain budgets that reflect this support, and recognition that their faculty really do bring in external funds for their teaching of house staff (and are thus valuable "taxpayers" in Dr Goldman's parlance.)

It is amazing that such amounts of money have been flowing for years mostly in secret. The secrecy has fueled incorrect, and in retrospect, bizarre ideas about the funding of medical education, and the value of medical educators to their institutions. This secrecy, in turn, has helped suppress the morale of medical educators, support the control of managers of health care professionals, and distort the flow of money within academic institutions and to compensation for certain favored individuals.

Would our dysfunctional health care system not be better off if we demanded transparency and accountability from its leaders?  In particular, the US government should make payments to hospitals for graduate medical education completely transparent, and develop a system to hold these hospitals accountable for how they spend the money.  Meanwhile, top leaders of hospitals receiving this money should make the amounts transparent, first to the people who are supposed to be doing the education that the money pays for, and to the public at large.  This would allow those running the relevant educational programs to develop reasonable and realistic budgets, to treat their faculty with respect, and to demonstrate what value they provide for the money received. 
The ongoing anechoic effect, and related deception and secrecy fostered by leaders in health care are major reasons our health care system is so dysfunctional, that costs are so high, and access and quality so poor.  True health care reform would ensure health care leaders put the mission before their personal enrichment, and act ethically with accountability, transparency, and honesty. 
References
1.   DeAngelis CD. Professors not professing. JAMA 2004; 292: 1060-1.  Link here.
2.  Goldman L, Halm EA.  A view from the top: general internal medicine from the perspective of a chair and dean.  SGIM Forum, April, 2007.  Link here.
3.  Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E.  Faculty Values in the Culture of Academic Medicine: Findings of a National Faculty Survey. Link here.
4.  Liebow M, Jaeger J, Schwartz MD. How does Medicare pay for graduate medical education? SGIM Forum, May, 2012.  Link here.
5. Chaudhry SI, Khanijo S, Halvorsen AJ, McDonald FS,Patel K. Accountability and transparency in graduate medical education expenditures. Am J Med 2012; 125: 517-522. Link here.

Rendering Unto Caesar - What the Abramson Family Cancer Research Institute vs Thompson Says About the Loss of the Academic Medical Mission

A case, reported by the New York Times as involving an intellectual property dispute, should create a lot of cognitive dissonance about the state of the academic medical mission.

Litigation Involving the Abramson Family Cancer Research Institute and Dr Craig B Thompson

Here is how the Times outlined the story:

The president of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York is in a billion-dollar dispute with his former workplace, a cancer institute at the University of Pennsylvania, over accusations that he walked away with groundbreaking research and used it to help start a valuable biotechnology company.

In a lawsuit, the Leonard and Madlyn Abramson Family Cancer Research Institute at Penn described its former scientific director, Dr. Craig B. Thompson, as 'an unscrupulous doctor' who 'chose to abscond with the fruits of the Abramson largess.'

In particular,

In the suit, the Abramson cancer institute, which has received more than $100 million from the philanthropist Leonard Abramson and his family, says that Dr. Thompson concealed his role in starting Agios, which has attracted investors with a potentially new way to treat cancer. The institute says Dr. Thompson’s actions deprived it of proceeds that could support future research, causing it damages that could exceed $1 billion.

So presumably the Abramson Institute is alleging that Thompson took its intellectual property and put it into Agios, and the Institute therefore wants compensation. Note that the Institute does not appear to be alleging either that Thompson was supposed to be its employee, but actually was working for Agios at the time he was supposed to be working for the institute; or that Thompson hid a a conflict of interest created by his financial relationship with Agios that could have affected how he fulfilled his professional responsibilities there.

Note further that certain other parties declared that they are not part of this dispute. These included Dr Thompson's current employer:

Sloan-Kettering declined to comment, saying it was not a party to the lawsuit....

These also included the University of Pennsylvania:

Susan E. Phillips, senior vice president for Penn Medicine, said that the suit had been filed not by the university but by the research institute, a separate entity. She said the university was investigating the accusations.

The nature of this dispute ought to generate several kinds of cognitive dissonance.

Protecting Intellectual Property vs Upholding the Academic Mission at the University of Pennsylvania

On one of its web pages, the Abramson Family Cancer Research Institute describes its history:

The Abramson Cancer center of the University of Pennsylvania provides each patient with exemplary care though a comprehensive team approach, personalized service, education and outreach, and nationally recognized cancer research programs.

The web page describes the institute as simply part of the larger University of Pennsylvania cancer center, which came to be named for the Abramson family:

Penn's Cancer Center was renamed in 2002 as the Abramson Cancer Center of the University of Pennsylvania, recognizing the Abramson family's $100 million commitment to support comprehensive cancer research and care.

Thus it seems that the Abramson institute is simply a piece of a traditional academic medical center.

The academic mission is traditionally described as the creation and teaching of knowledge. Thus, if an academic institution creates new knowledge, its should then disseminate it, not own it. Of course, in the US, since the Bayh-Dole act was passed, academic institutions were given the ability to patent their discoveries, and began to protect and sequester the knowledge they contained, rather than disseminating it.

In this case, however, one part of a large university and a large academic medical center seems to be concentrating entirely on its right of ownership of intellectual property, not the traditional academic mission. The fact that this dispute has lead to litigation suggests that the academic organization is now intent on protecting, rather than disseminating knowledge. The dispute appears to be between a commercial research company and its allegedly errant former hired manager.

The Abramson Institute: Part or Independent of the Academic Medical Center?  

A little more digging suggests that the nature of the Abramson institute is not as clear as is described in its web-page. A GuideStar search revealed that the institute is actually legally independent from the university. It filed its own 990 form (latest version, covering 2009-2010, here.)

The filing did list various entities, including the Clinical Care Associates of the University of Pennsylvania Health System, and the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania as "related tax-exempt organizations."

However, this filing should create cognitive dissonance about what the underlying nature of the Institute? Is it part of the University of Pennsylvania and its medical center, or is independent but cooperating?

This dissonance is only enhanced by the ambiguous response of the University of Pennsylvania to the lawsuit. If the Institute is part of the University, then the University ought to be party to the lawsuit, it would seem.

This filing with the US government did underline the Institute's commitment to disseminating research. A description of its tax "exempt purposes" included:

Education - scientists at the Institute actively share their discoveries with the research community, physicians, and students.

As above, this statement of purpose appears not to fit with the filing of a lawsuit to obtain damages due to the alleged taking of intellectual property. If this really were the Institute's mission, would not they want the intellectual property liberated so it could be actively shared? The cognitive dissonance about the mission of the Institute and of the University versus the protection and sequestration of intellectual property is thus increased.

Upholding the Academic Mission vs Staying Uninvolved at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center

As an aside, note that Dr Thompson is now not just working for Agios. In fact, he has been President of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center since 2010 (look here). Just like the Abramson Cancer Center, Sloan-Kettering is an academic medical center with the traditional mission of teaching, research, and patient care. Here is its mission statement:

As one of the world's premier cancer centers, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center is committed to exceptional patient care, leading-edge research, and superb educational programs.

So one would think that people there ought to be concerned by allegations that its current president took intellectual property without authorization, and that he is "an unscrupulous doctor." If these allegations were to be proven false, they seemingly would represent a major, unwarranted slur on its and his reputation. If they were to be proven true, they would indicate that current leadership might not have the character to uphold the mission. Either outcome would be serious and have serious implications. However, at the moment, this noted academic medical institution has expressed neither outrage about possibly false accusations nor resolve to investigate the matter and then weed out any leaders not devoted to the mission.

Thus, the apparent intention of the leadership of Memorial Sloan-Kettering to stay uninvolved with this case ought to generate more cognitive dissonance.


Summary

The cognitive dissonances evoked by the case of the Abramson Institute vs Dr Thompson ought to inspire questions about what our academic medical institutions have become.  While they proclaim their devotion to research and teaching to improve health and health care, and advance science, they may increasingly act like commercial research organizations whose main goal is to generate increased revenue from products and services, and in this case, from intellectual property. 

It is hard to see how this emphasis on holding onto rather than disseminating new knowledge will be good in the long run for science, learning, or patient care.

We are now a good 30+ years into our ill-fated American experiment about the effects of turning medicine commercial and making health care a commodity. So far, it has yielded the highest costs in the world, but declining access, mediocre quality, and demoralized professionals.  Squabbling among top researchers and leading academic medical institutions over the ownership of intellectual property for the sake of revenue, not dissemination, is the latest symbol of the decline of our health care.

I can only hope that all the parties involved suddenly remember that they are supposed to be creating and disseminating knowledge, not just getting rich. 

How the Anechoic Effect Is Institutionalized - A Hospital Policy Against Unsupervised Discussion with the Media

In a single sentence, a short, obscure article in the Worcester (MA) Business Journal on life at a community hospital after a for-profit corporate take-over:

Several Nashoba employees, who didn't want their names used because it's against hospital policy to talk to the media without authorization, said they're happy with the new insurance plan.

We have often discussed the anechoic effect, how cases involving or discussions of the topics we address on Health Care Renewal, the concentration and abuse of power in health care, fail to produce any responses, or echoes.  It was almost an aside, but the sentence above provides evidence of the existence of apparently blanket hospital policies against unsupervised discussion with the media. Here is an example of the institutionalization of the anechoic effect.

This example raises three immediate questions. How prevalent is this? How long has it been going on? What is it meant to hide?

Prevalence

This article is only about a single hospital. However, the context of the article is the take-over of Nashoba Hospital by Steward Health Care. Steward Health Care is a for-profit health care corporation that grew out of the take-over of the formerly not-for-profit Caritas Christi health system by the private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management. Steward Health Care now comprises  eight hospitals, and also owns physician practices (apparently including over 2000 doctors based on a quick search using its "doctor finder" function.) Thus it is likely that the policy at Nashoba Hospital that prevents unsupervised discussion with the media also applies at seven other hospitals, and perhaps to the practices of over 2000 doctors. Thus it is very likely that this hospital gag policy is not unique, and may be widespread. However, recursively, the existence of such gag policies will make it hard to determine their own prevalence.

Note that we have posted a few times about confidentiality clauses mainly within physicians' contracts here.

Duration

This policy is likely relatively new, since the take-over of Caritas Christi by Cerberus occurred in 2010. My guess is that the rise of such policies may parallel the resurgence of for-profit hospitals and hospital systems, and perhaps the new involvement of private equity firms in such organizations.

In my humble experience, gag policies and confidentiality clauses at least within non-profit teaching hospitals were virtually unheard of from the time I began medical school (1974) to when I left my last full-time academic medical position (2005).

Note that we recently found out (because of investigative journalism about presidential candidate Mitt Romney's previous involvement with private equity firm Bain Capital) that such firms are generally rebranded leveraged buy-out firms. They have become known for their secretiveness. Therefore, maybe it should not be surprising that they have imposed such secretiveness on hospitals and health care professionals.

Rationale 

The big question is why should hospital employees not be allowed to talk to the media without management supervision? I can only speculate.

In this case, perhaps such secretiveness is just the habit of the private equity executives who now run the hospital system. Even if this is the reason, they ought to reconsider. Hospitals and health care professionals due have a solemn obligation to keep confidential their patients' medical information. However, otherwise health care organizations and health care professionals ought to be as transparent as possible.

Maintaining such a level of secrecy could lead to some suspicions, for example, that the generic managers of the organization distrust the professionals they hire who actually provide patient care; worse, that the managers fear discussion that might question their actions or abilities; worse, that the managers want to silence whistle-blowers; or even worse, that the managers have something unethical or illegal to hide. That is all speculation, of course.

On the other hand, we have discussed again and again how the anechoic effect has stifled discussion of what is wrong with health care, and hence prevented meaningful health care reform. Gagging hospital employees is an obvious extension and institutionalization of the anechoic effect. It should not be done, because we need honest discussion of what is really wrong with health care so we can come up with some real solutions.

CEO Compensation: Nothing to See Here, Just Move Along

An article in the Washington Post showed how uncomfortable executives of big corporations, including health corporations, are about making their outsize compensation transparent. 

Here’s one financial figure some big U.S. companies would rather keep secret: how much more their chief executive makes than the typical worker.

Now a group backed by 81 major companies — including McDonald’s, Lowe’s, General Dynamics, American Airlines, IBM and General Mills — is lobbying against new rules that would force disclosure of that comparison.

The lobbying effort began more than a year ago. It involved some of the biggest names in corporate America and meetings with members of both parties on the House Financial Services Committee and Senate banking committee.

The companies and their Republican allies in Congress call comparisons between the chief and everyone else in the company 'useless.'

It's not just useless, they also claimed:

Disclosing such comparisons 'can mislead or confuse investors,' said Rep. Nan A.S. Hayworth (R-N.Y.), who filed the bill to repeal the disclosure. 'It creates heat but sheds no light.'

She also said the calculation of the ratio would be a burden for companies, especially those with global operations.

One apparent reason for their discomfort is that the pay of top hired executives has been skyrocketing while the pay of most other employees stagnates:

'The real reason House Republicans want to keep the typical worker’s pay secret is that it may embarrass some companies to reveal that they pay their CEO in the range of 400 times what they pay their typical worker,' said Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who added the requirement to the financial regulatory overhaul bill that passed last year.

Executive compensation at the nation’s largest firms has more than quadrupled in real terms since the 1970s, according to research by Carola Frydman of MIT’s Sloan School of Management and Raven E. Molloy of the Federal Reserve, even as pay for 90 percent of American earners has stalled.

In 1970, average executive pay at the nation’s top companies was 28 times the average worker income, according to the Frydman-Molloy data and numbers provided by Emmanuel Saez at the University of California at Berkeley. By 2005, executive pay had jumped to 158 times that of the average worker.

Behind the repeal effort are some of the largest US companies:

The Center on Executive Compensation has led the criticism of the provision. The group is part of the HR Policy Association, which represents the human resources executives at 325 large companies.

The thrust of the group’s criticism is that the information would have little value for investors comparing firms, because companies have workforces that differ in skills and expected pay. Wages also vary across regions and industries.

Current rules already require disclosure of executive compensation; the new requirement calls for the additional disclosure of median worker pay. Critics say that would add little to what is already known.

'You can already tell where a CEO falls relative to his peers,' said Tim Bartl, senior vice president and general counsel for the Center on Executive Compensation. 'You can already tell where he falls relative to the average worker in the industry. What is this number going to tell us?'

Last year, the HR Policy Association paid Bartl’s law firm, McGuiness & Yager, more than $1.5 million for lobbying, according to OpenSecrets.org.

The HR Policy Association's board of directors includes executives from some of the biggest health care corporations, including pharmaceutical and device firms (Amgen, Johnson and Johnson, and Merck), commercial health insurance companies and managed care organizations (Aetna, CIGNA, and Humana), and other firms with major health care interests (General Electric, Procter and Gamble).

Note that Mr Bartl's concession that calculation of the ratio would be simple seemed to contradict Rep Hayworth's claim that the calculation would be burdensome.

Summary

It certainly appears that top hired managers of big corporations are not happy about the common people seeing how huge their pay is compared to that of other workers. They seem particularly unhappy to have their own stockholders, the common people who actually own their companies and to whom they theoretically report see how much they are making. Perhaps they fear the realization that they may be running their companies more for their personal advantage than in the interests of their supposed owners, much less the other, lesser employees, much less their customers, clients and patients, much less the public at large.

The ability of small cabals of top executives at big corporations to set their own pay independent of the wishes and interests of the corporations' owners would seem to be the fundamental threat to the capitalistic and free market ideal. After all, in my humble and perhaps naive opinion, private ownership is central to capitalism, and the apparent managers' coup d'etat seems to be a existential challenge to private ownership. (For much more informed commentary on how executives have wrested control from owners, see the blog Naked Capitalism and Robert A G Monks' website.) One wonders why so few of the many vocal supposed supporters of capitalism and free markets fail to see this as a problem.

Even though it is increasingly informative to see what has happened to health care within the context of the larger political economy, Health Care Renewal, however, is about health care issues first. So to put this in health care terms....

First, we see again how top leaders of health care organizations prefer opacity to transparency, especially when that opacity increases their ability to put self-enrichment ahead of their organizations' missions and ultimately individuals' and the public's health. They embrace opacity when it protects the perverse incentives that likely are the major cause of increasing health care costs, declining access, and worsening quality.

To repeat, and repeat, and repeat.... to reform health care, we must reverse the managers' coup d'etat, and restore leadership of health care organizations that puts the mission, and the health of patients and the population first, and is accountable to corporate owners (when applicable) and to patients and the public.  But that will mean now going up against those who have made themselves the richest and most powerful people in the country and the world, who will not lightly give up their oligarchy.

VCU President Rao's Previous Code of Silence

We recently posted about the code of silence imposed by Virginia Commonwealth University President Stephen Rao on his staff.  It turns out now that this was not his first exercise in imposing a code of silence. Before he was at Virginia Commonwealth University, Rao was President of Central Michigan University.  Central Michigan Life just reported:

While serving as CMU president, Rao required all office employees to sign a similar confidentiality agreement stating all names, places, dates or incidents that happened in his office were not to be shared with anyone or discussed outside the office.

'I understand that the information and all files, letters, projects, telephone calls and anything relating to the work performed in the President’s Office and in my capacity as an employee is highly confidential,' stated the agreement, which was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. 'I understand that it may not be discussed with anyone outside this office who does not have a need to know, which includes any other CMU employee, as well as my family members, friends, etc.'

The CMU confidentiality agreement extended past any employee’s tenure at CMU, stating that the contract must not be broken past the term of employment. If an employee were to break the confidentiality agreement past employment, possible consequences included personal liability and potential lawsuits.

Note that just as was the case in Virginia, this agreement placed employees at risk not only of losing their jobs, but of being sued were they to violate the agreement.

By the way, while Central Michigan University does not include a medical school and academic medical center, as does VCU, it does have, and therefore the previous agreement affected the operations of multiple health related programs (see here) including allied health, health administration, physical therapy, and psychology.

As we wrote previously, such a code of silence subverts the university's central mission, and directly opposes the transparency I believe is necessary for good governance in health care.  The discovery of this previous confidentiality agreement at CMU suggests that such agreements may not be rare in health care. 

We have long discussed the anechoic effect in health care, how certain topics and issues are just not to be discussed, especially those that might embarrass or oppose the personal interests of health care leaders.  We have postulated that the effect operates through fear of offending supervisors, colleagues, or those who provide one's pay.  It may be, however, that the anechoic effect has been codified through confidentiality clauses.  As noted above, such codification can mean whistle-blowers may risk lawsuits as well as job loss and ostracism.

If there are other codes of silence operative in health care, I hope that sunlight soon shines upon them. 

That sunlight may cause such codes to shrivel is suggested by President Rao's rescinding of the code at VCU soon after it was made public, as reported by the Richmond Times-Dispatch:

With the board of visitors meeting yesterday to evaluate his performance, Virginia Commonwealth University President Michael Rao rescinded the confidentiality agreements he required employees working in his office to sign.

Rao sent employees a letter Wednesday that said the confidentiality agreements were intended "to protect the privacy of my family, particularly my children, in my home."

'The confidentiality agreements have been the subject of recent scrutiny and criticism and, unfortunately, have been misinterpreted in terms of what I sought to be accomplished by these agreements,' he wrote. 'I sincerely regret any undue burden or ill will that these agreements may have caused. Therefore, I have decided to withdraw all such confidentiality agreements.'

Such codes ought to be perceived as unethical, and perhaps should be made illegal.  Meanwhile, though, the anechoic effect continues.