Was the Wright Medical CEO Really "Pleased" to "Continue Our Commitment to the Highest Standards of Legal and Ethical Conduct?"

This story fits into the "if you believed that one, I have a bridge to sell you" category. 

Let's go back seven months to 2010, when we discussed the legal settlement, which included submission to deferred prosecution and corporate integrity agreements by Wright Medical, a device manufacturer.  We noted that the company CEO, one Gary D Henley, said he was "pleased to announce these agreements and look[ing] forward to working with the independent monitor as we continue our commitment to the highest standards of ethical and legal conduct."  At the time, we wondered whether the only real reason he was pleased was that he got to keep his job (with total compensation of greater than $2 million a year) and hang onto his stock options (then consisting of 436,601 shares).

Now it is 2011, and the Memphis Daily News reported that last month, Mr Henley was out of a job:
It was just last month that [Chairman David] Stevens was appointed interim president and CEO after Gary D. Henley resigned from the position, which he had held since 2006.

Stevens at that time asked not to be considered for the permanent position.

Henley tendered his resignation prior to a board of directors meeting called to discuss management’s oversight of the company’s ongoing compliance program.

The board accepted Henley’s resignation, but deemed it to be without 'good reason' under the terms of his employment agreement, making him ineligible for severance.

He was accompanied out the door by
Frank S. Bono, the company’s senior vice president and chief technology officer, for failing to exhibit appropriate regard for Wright’s ongoing compliance program.

It appeared that the previous company leadership may not have been all that "pleased" to work with external monitors to "continue our commitment to the highest standards of ethical and legal conduct." The Daily News also reported:
Wright Medical Group Inc. on Thursday announced that it received a letter from the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey pursuant to Paragraph 50 of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement stating that the USAO believes Wright Medical Group knowingly and willfully breached material provisions of the DPA.

Also, Corporate Counsel reported:
Two days after its general counsel departed abruptly, the Wright Medical Group, Inc., said Thursday that the U.S. attorney’s office believes the company 'has knowingly and willfully' breached its deferred prosecution agreement.

As a result, the company said it could face 'significant liability' including potential criminal and civil litigation. It also faces possible exclusion from federal health care programs such as Medicare, 'which would have a material adverse effect on our financial condition.'

The Tennessee-based company revealed the legal problems in 8-K filings on Wednesday and Thursday with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Wright has declined further comment.

One explanation for the company's pessimism:
The board recently received a tip about non-compliance and hired unnamed outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation. The probe found 'credible evidence of serious wrongdoing,' which the board communicated to the U.S. attorney’s office on Wednesday.

The Memphis Daily News noted that another slew of managers just went out the door:
Raymond Kolls, senior vice president, general counsel and secretary, Alicia Napoli, vice president of Clinical and Regulatory Affairs, and Cary Hagan, senior vice president of EMEA Commercial Operations, have all stepped down from their positions.

So should we believe Wright Medical Chairman and now interim CEO Stevens when he said:
The board is committed to maintaining the highest standards of ethical conduct and we remain diligent in ensuring that Wright Medical complies with all applicable laws and regulations...
?

Are you looking to buy a bridge? I know a nice one in Brooklyn.

More seriously, day in and day out we hear righteous, if not pompous pronouncements from health care organizational leaders about their organizations' integrity, brilliant performance, quality of care, devotion to patients, etc, etc, etc. Meanwhile, we have seen an astonishing parade of legal settlements, sometimes including guilty pleas to bribery, fraud, kickbacks, and other crimes by top health care organizations.  This parade raises serious questions about the performance and integrity of some of our biggest and best known health care organizations.

In nearly all cases, these settlements did not include specific negative consequences for those who authorized, directed or implemented the bad behavior that caused the need for the settlements. In nearly every case, the top leaders of the organizations continued to get generous compensation, often more generous than Mr Henley's $2 million plus a year.

Yet rarely does the media, much less health care scholarship check back later to see if the righteous pronouncements turned out to be true. Rarely do they check back to see if the settlements lead to better behavior.

Here is one vivid anecdote that suggests that the pronouncements may be nothing more than vapid PR, and the settlements lead to no change in behavior as long as the people who were in charge when the bad behavior occurred remain in charge, and richly remunerated.

So the next time you see a corporate health care CEO's boasts, think about that bridge in Brooklyn

To reprise: we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

[Originally posted on Health Care Renewal by Roy Poses]

Has the Heart Rhythm Society Become More Like a Marketing Firm?

ProPublica's and USA Today's joint investigation of one medical society's ties to industry has created a stir.  (The full ProPublica version is here.)  It's worth doing a little reading between the lines to see its further implications.

The Basic Story

The story focused first on the annual meeting of the Heart Rhythm Society (HRS), a sub-specialized medical society for cardiologists who specialize in electrical or rhythm disorders.  The meeting seemingly has become a giant marketing opportunity, supported by $5 million in industry money, in which practically every flat surface became a medium for advertising.  (The ProPublica article included multiple pictures of branded items from carpets in the exhibit halls to the backs of the seats in shuttle buses.) Also,
St. Jude Medical adorns every hotel key card. Medtronic ads are splashed on buses, banners and the stairs underfoot. Logos splay across shuttle bus headrests, carpets and cellphone-charging stations.

At night, a drug firm gets the last word: A promo for the heart drug Multaq stood on each doctor’s nightstand Wednesday.

Then reporters Charles Ornstein and Tracy Weber looked at the HRS as a whole, noting that half the society's total income comes from industry, and "Twelve of 18 directors are paid speakers or consultants for the companies, one holds stock, and the outgoing president disclosed research ties, according to the society’s website, which does not specify how much they receive."  Furthermore, "Two of the society’s biggest funders — Boston Scientific and St. Jude Medical — have paid millions since 2009 to settle federal allegations that they improperly paid kickbacks to unidentified physicians to use their cardiac devices. Neither company admitted wrongdoing."

The article raised tantalizing questions and implied others, but despite the reporters' best attempts, leaders of the HRS and their defenders failed to address them.  Their failure to grapple with the real issues is to me the most disturbing part of the story.

Why Take the Money?

ProPublica published a companion piece consisting of questions to and responses from the HRS President, Dr Douglas L Packer, and President-Elect, Dr Bruce L Wilkoff. The first response was the rationale for taking the money:
Advances in electrophysiology depend on a collaborative relationship between physicians and industry....

Later,
It is imperative that we interact with industry to develop better therapies and test them thoroughly in rigorous clinical trials.

This response is very common from physicians and other health professionals defending relationships with industry. Note that this response, similar to previous ones, is off the point. The issue is not all relationships with industry. It is about relationships in which industry pays people, or in this case, a group of people for purposes not always clear, but when clear are related to marketing. Payments from industry to physicians and health professionals are not necessary for collaboration. If the goal is innovation and development of therapies, how is that supported by payments to a medical society to provide marketing opportunities?

Why Subject the Meeting Attendees to All That Advertising?

Much of the money received by the society was obviously for marketing purposes. The effect of these payments was the advertising barrage noted above. So the obvious questions are: is it beneficial for the society to expose its members and other meeting attendees to all this marketing?  Should making its members accessible to marketing be a major part of the society's activities?

When questioned by ProPublica, the organization's leadership evaded:
Q. Items at your conference—from key cards to newspaper wraps—are available for sponsorships. What is the purpose of these sponsorships? Does the livelihood of the organization depend on them? Do the ads have an impact on what your members buy and use in their practices?

A. The Heart Rhythm Society offers sponsorship opportunities at the annual scientific sessions to provide advertising opportunities for participating exhibitors. Approximately 50 percent of the revenue for the annual scientific sessions is generated by industry in a combination of exhibit space rental (largest), sponsorship/promotional advertising opportunities, unrestricted educational grants and exhibitor office suites. The society does not collect data or ask attendees if sponsorship or advertising impacts their purchase decisions.

Very few people quoted in the ProPublic series ventured to defend the marketing onslaught. There was only this. In a newer follow up article, Chris Ornstein quoted meeting attendees with similar sentiments:
'I’ve always been rather offended that people who aren’t doctors think I’m susceptible to bribes and corruption,' [Raleigh, NC electophysiologist Dr Mark] Englehardt said. 'A lot of what you learn about products is from people that sell the products. … You have to learn it somewhere.'
Note that the good Dr Englehardt lead off by invoking a straw-man fallacy. Being influenced by advertising is not the same as taking bribes. No one accused those attending the conference of taking bribes. More importantly, his argument in favor of advertising invoked a false dilemma (or false dichotomy). There certainly are sources of information about products, and particularly about electrophysiologic devices, beyond manufacturers' advertising.  The choice is not simply ignorance versus advertising.

Others merely sought to minimize the harms of exposure to so much advertising. For example, one of the HRS' defenders, who not coincidentally runs a much larger medical society, which also has had its issues with its extensive ties to industry, (look here) said:
The 'circus element' of the exhibit booths doesn’t unduly influence attendees, [CEO of the American College of Cardiology Jack] Lewin said. 'I don’t buy a soft drink just because of the advertising… I buy it because I like it.'

Maybe not, but the analogy may not be apt. Furthermore, we have seen a stream of physicians, other health professionals, and academics deny that they are influenced by marketing or monetary incentives. It is hard to believe, however, that industry would spend so much trying to influence opinions without some evidence that the money provides some results. In addition, most people seem to lack insight about what influences their opinions, especially when consciously admitting such influence might threaten their self-image.

On the other hand, the follow-up article also noted:
Some doctors acknowledged that the corporate barrage must have some effect. 'I hope not, but I’m certain that it does,' said Dr. Christopher Conley of Nashville, Tenn. 'I’m sure the companies do their own research. They wouldn’t be here, they wouldn’t be putting all this money out if it didn’t influence people.'

It seems obvious that all the advertising was meant to sell products. It seems unlikely that marketers spend so much money without some reason to believe it would have an effect. Even if it had little effect, was there any benefit to selling all that marketing space that would counter-act one glaringly obvious harm? By raising so much money from such obvious and widespread marketing, the Cardiac Rhythm Society meeting is liable to be viewed more as a marketing event than a serious scientific or professional venue.

Is It a Professional Society, or a Marketing Firm?

As noted above, accepting so much money for such a large marketing presence at its national meeting makes the Heart Rhythm Society appear to resemble a marketing firm.  Other information revealed by ProPublica increases the apparent similarity. 

Societies are groups of people who gather for a common purpose.  Medical societies ought to be groups of doctors who gather for common purposes, usually including promoting their own professional interests and upholding professional values.  They typically used to convene meetings for educational or advocacy purposes, and publish journals or other media.  Thus their typical sources of revenue could be dues, meeting registrations, and subscription and similar fees. 

However, as noted above, half of the Heart Rhythm Society's budget comes from industry, specifically "from makers of drugs, catheters and defibrillators used to control abnormal heart rhythms," according to ProPublica.  The picture was similar in 2009.  I reviewed the organization's most recent (2009) financial disclosure (990 form) filed with the US Internal Revenue Service and made available to the public by Guidestar.  In that year, the organization's total revenues were $14,772,708.  Revenues from "grants and sponsorships" were $4,061,883 and from annual meeting exhibits were $3,065,750, for a total of $7,127,633.  So only about half of the society's revenues came from traditional sources, including meeting registration ($4,749,974) and dues ($1,513,361).  Given that some of the registration fees doubtless came from industry attendees, and some product sales ($212,298) and royalties ($511,760) also came from industry sources, the organization's revenue makes it appear at least at least as much like a marketing firm as a medical society. 

Note that one group of beneficiaries of this industry largess was the organization's paid managers.  The 990 form listed eight executives who made over $150,000 a year in the worst years so far of the Great Recession.  Its CEO received total compensation of $532,691.  His compensation used 3.6% of the organization's total revenue. 

Moreover, the majority of the Heart Rhythm Society's board and officers have major ties to manufacturers of drugs and devices used in the diagnosis and treatment of heart rhythm problems.  As noted above, 12/18 directors were found to have ties to the companies which advertised at the meeting.  Perusal of disclosure forms which the Society, to its credit, does make public here, revealed only three of 20 officers and directors who had nothing to disclose in 2011-12. The current President, Dr Douglas L Packer, had two pages of disclosures, including 10 different device or biotechnology companies from whom he got "significant" (over $10,000) grants or royalty income.  Many other board members and officers had "significant" financial relationships, consulting/ honoraria, speakers' bureau membership, equity interests, with drug, biotechnology, or device companies which make products relevant to cardiac rhythm disorders.
 
The leaders of the society asserted their ability to "manage" industry relationships:
Due to thorough policies and procedures in place for working with industry, the Heart Rhythm Society is comfortable identifying and managing various interactions with industry. Additionally, the society seeks multiple supporters for its educational programs in order to avoid the perception that programs are tied to a specific company. The society has sufficient measures in place to prevent undue influence from industry or introduction of industry bias into HRS-sponsored educational programs, research, scientific documents and policy initiatives.

Later, when directly questioned about the implications of receiving half the organization's funding from industry, they evaded again:
Q. Some researchers on conflicts of interest say that when a medical society receives half of its funding from industry, it is codependent on them and therefore will—consciously or not—avoid criticizing the products they make. How would you respond?

A.  The Heart Rhythm Society’s first and foremost concern is to provide effective and appropriate treatment options to our patients.  It is imperative that we interact with industry to develop better therapies and test them thoroughly in rigorous clinical trials. For this reason, we believe that interacting with industry is not inherently wrong with the correct measures in place to mitigate the possibility of conflicts of interest.

Moreover, the Society maintains a neutral position on all products and services offered by industry. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is our source for information about new products, safety alerts and drug recalls.

Half of the organization's revenues come from industry, and the organization is willing to expose its meeting attendees to a barrage of advertising to obtain most of these revenues. Providing such advertising does not seem to maintaining "a neutral position." Do its leaders really mean that this proportion of support has no influence on them or how the organization is run? Nearly all the organization's officers and directors have their own financial relationships with industry. Do they really think that these relationships have no effect on their thinking? Would the leaders be indifferent to losing half of the organization's financial support and their own personal financial relationships with industry? If they would not be indifferent to this eventuality, can they argue they are uninfluenced?  Would the organization's CEO, whose compensation is over 3% of the organization's total revenue, be indifferent to a decrease of 50% in that revenue?  If not, could he be uninfluenced by the source of this revenue?

Summary: Why Pay Dues to a Marketing Firm?

As health care dysfunction has gotten worse over the years, as costs rise, access falls, and quality stagnate, as physicians are subject perverse incentives and deceptive marketing, as the medical research literature has been suppressed and manipulated, there have been surprisingly few responses from medical societies.  The case study provided by ProPublica of one such society suggests one reason why.  Medical societies seem to behave increasingly like marketing firms.  The majority of their revenue may not come from their members.  They may be willing to subject their members to a flood of marketing to make more money.  Their leaders may have extensive relationships with industry.  Their paid managers may be dependent on industry revenue for out sized compensation.

If medical societies have come to resemble marketing firms, is it any wonder that they have not spoken up against the commercialization of health care, even when the result has not been good for physicians' core values?  But in that case, why would physicians who care about their patients and their core values want to belong and pay dues to marketing firms?  Inquiring minds want to know....

Maybe physicians should only join medical societies that really act like medical societies.

For further discussion in the blogsphere, see this post by Merrill Goozner on the GoozNews blog, this post by Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, this post by Daniel Carlat on the Carlat Psychiatry blog, and this post by Paul Thacker on the Project on Government Oversight blog.

Logical Fallacies to Defend CEOs from Responsibility for their Companies' Bad Actions

There is now quite a kerfuffle over the US Department of Health and Human Service's threat to to stop doing business with the CEO of Forest Laboratories.  As we noted here, his company pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice and misbranding, and agreed to pay a $313 million fine.  The major allegations by the government were that the company marketed antidepressants to children when they had only previously been approved for adults. Their marketing tactics allegedly included suppressing negative studies, and paying physicians to prescribe the drugs.

The kerfuffle involves a number of ostensible authorities and pundits defending the CEO, and challenging the government's attempts to hold him responsible for his company's actions.  The kerfuffle also provides some splendid examples of logical fallacies deployed in defense of the powers that be. 

Double Standards: Avoiding Blame for Failures While Taking Credit for Successes

The greatest angst seemed to be generated that Mr Solomon could be sanctioned for actions which he did not directly take. 

First, the Wall Street Journal reported that:
Forest Labs representatives said they were shocked when the intent-to-ban notice was received a few weeks later, because Mr. Solomon wasn't accused by the government of misconduct.

Forest is sticking by its chief. 'No one has ever alleged that Mr. Solomon did anything wrong, and excluding him [from the industry] is unjustified,' said general counsel Herschel Weinstein. 'It would also set an extremely troubling precedent that would create uncertainty throughout the industry and discourage regulatory settlements.'

Later in the same article, there was more dismay that Mr Solomon should suffer any negative consequences for the actions of someone else:
Lawyers not involved in the Forest case said the attempt to punish an executive who isn't accused of misconduct could tie up the industry's day-to-day work in legal knots.

'This 'gotcha' approach to enforcement runs the risk of creating a climate within organizations that is inconsistent with the spirit of innovation that is critical to the industry,' said Allen Waxman of Kaye Scholer LLP in New York, who was formerly an in-house counsel at a drug maker.
However, Mr Solomon is not a janitor.  He was the company CEO, and was paid a fortune ostensibly because he was responsible for everything going on in the company.

In fact, the most recent (2010) company proxy statement included this description of Mr Solomon:
We believe that Mr. Solomon's experience as a senior executive in our industry, his in-depth knowledge of our Company and its day-to-day operations, and his strong strategic vision for the Company qualify him to serve on the board. [italics added for emphasis]
These attributes presumably also justified his total compensation, which was $8,267,236 in 2010.

If Mr. Solomon's outsize compensation was based on his strategic vision, informed by his "in-depth knowledge of ... [the] Company and its day-to-day operations," how could his defenders claim he knew nothing and had no responsibility for its detailed and in-depth efforts to deceptively market antidepressants to children and adolescents? (See posts here and here for details of that marketing scheme as revealed in court documents.)  This appears to be a double-standard (as found in this alternative catalog of logical fallacies).

By the way, also note how Mr Waxman invoked the "innovation meme," i.e., that any regulation of the company or restrictions on its actions will prevent innovation. The same meme was invoked by a business school professor in one of the first attempts to defend this corporate executive from any attempts to hold him accountable for his company's bad behavior (see post here).  As I noted earlier, "innovation" is used so often to excuse almost any action by large health care corporations that I suspect the meme was developed by  corporate public relations.

Straw-Men and Double-Standards: Barring Mr Solomon vs "Imagined" Actions and Treatment of Foreign Leaders

Another protest was that the government's actions were disproportionate, especially how they treated other cases, as written by Robert Goldberg in the Spectator:
Now it turns out that Team O is tougher on drug company CEOs than it is on brutal dictators and a movement whose goal is wiping out Israel. The administration is applying a little used government approach to knee-capping executives it doesn't like by threatening that HHS won't allow Forest Laboratories to sell medications to Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health programs (which means every health plan under Obamacare) unless it tosses the company's CEO, Howard Solomon. According to news accounts, the action is being taken because government lawyers claim that just fining the company billions isn't stopping illegal behavior. But neither Mr. Solomon nor Forest has been found guilty of any wrongdoing.

Mr Goldberg also asserted, as in the examples above, that Mr Solomon was not personally found guilty.  This may be so, but given that his company gave him credit for all the good resulting from the company's day-to-day actions, denying his responsibility for day-to-day actions gone bad is a double standard.

Furthermore, Mr Goldberg's assertion that Forest was not found guilty is at best a quibble, and at worse, an untruth. As we noted above, the company pleaded (but was not "found) guilty to several charges, a felony and a misdemeanor.

Mr Goldberg then developed another kind of fallacy, this time by comparing the government's treatment of Mr Solomon with some hypothetical actions:
Can you imagine the administration using this tactic against health IT firms, unions, the New Black Panthers, ACORN, or investment banks? For different reasons for each, the answer is 'No.'
This appears to be a compounded set of straw men fallacies.  No one knows whether the government would use these tactics in future hypothetical cases.  What one may imagine could occur in such hypothetical cases is not directly comparable to what has occurred in the current case.  Invoking these imagined future actions amounts to invoking straw men.   
Mr Goldberg got even more imaginative, comparing the government's actions vis a vis Mr Solomon to its actions in the foreign policy realm:
Meanwhile the threat against Forest and its CEO is more draconian than actions the Obama administration is taking against Assad. The dictator who has slaughtered his people, aided Iran, built a uranium-enrichment facility, staged the Hezbollah takeover of Lebanon, and whose country is soon to be part of the UN Human Rights Council has received a stern warning from the president but nothing more.
Of course, it is one thing for a government agency to decide not to do business with an individual within the country whose company admitted to violating the law. It is another thing for a government to attempt to take "actions" against a foreign leader over whom the government has no legal authority.  So here is another kind of double-standard (see this alternative catalog of logical fallacies.)

Straw Man: The Case of Rituxan

Meanwhile, in Forbes, Charles L Hooper and David R Henderson argued that Forest Laboratories' actions do not merit any punishment at all, not of the company nor of Mr Solomon:
But it's bad to market unapproved drugs and to promote drugs for unapproved uses, right? Not exactly.

First, Hooper and Henderson argued that Forest Laboratories' off-label marketing of l-thyroxine (a thyroid hormone) was a mere technicality. This appears to be mainly a distraction, since most of the case involved marketing antidepressants.  In any case, they then argued that:
The fact is that off-label uses of drugs have saved lives. Consider Genentech and Biogen Idec's Rituxan, which the FDA approved in 1997 for relapsed or refractory CD20-positive B-cell low-grade non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL).

Of course, the Forest Laboratory case did not involve punishing physicians for off-label uses of any drug. It involved punishing Forest Laboratories and possibly its CEO for the marketing of drugs for off-label uses. The drugs involved were obviously not Rituxan. They did include Celexa, an antidepressant, which no one ever claimed is a life-saving drug (but which is a member of a class of drugs that may be ineffective and may increase the risk of suicidal ideation or even action in children and adolescents, the groups for which it was marketed off-label by Forest Laboratories).   So the attempt to invoke Rituxan, as if someone was proposing restrictions on its off-label use, was another straw man.   

Summary

So once again we see how logical fallacies are used to defend the powers that be in health care.  Once again, note that the these logically challenged defenses come from those with financial ties to the same powers that be.  (In addition to the affiliations noted above, Mr Goldberg is Vice President of the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, which SourceWatch describes as a "pharmaceutical industry front group," while Charles L Hooper is "president of Objective Insights, a company that consults for pharmaceutical and biotech companies.")

Let us see if anyone can offer a logical argument why health care corporate CEOs should not be held responsible for their corporations' misbehavior, or if anyone without financial ties to such corporations is willing to defend such lack of responsibility. 

Meanwhile, to repeat again and again,  we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Merck KGaA Settles, Again

They just keep marching along, legal settlements, that is.  The latest entry in the parade is Merck KGaA (of Switzerland, not to be confused with the American Merck and Co, Inc), as per the AP, via ABC News:
The Department of Justice said Wednesday that multinational drugmaker Merck Serono SA has agreed to pay $44.3 million to settle allegations that it illegally promoted one of its drugs using kickbacks to doctors.

Federal prosecutors said that Merck Serono and EMD Serono allegedly made inappropriate payments to hundreds of doctors for prescribing its multiple sclerosis drug, Rebif, between 2002 and 2009. Merck Serono paid to send doctors to various training meetings and conferences at upscale resorts and other locations, according to the Department of Justice.

Of course, while agreeing to pay out the money, the company denies everything:
The company pointed out in a statement: 'the settlement contains no claims that unnecessary prescriptions for Rebif were written, no allegations of patient harm and no admission of fault by the company.'

One wonders whether $44 million is now such a trivial amount to a large health care corporation that companies are willing to pay so much just to avoid the inconvenience of a trial? Or did perhaps the company leadership worry it might lose this trial?

Note that regardless of the above company statement, the US Department of Justice asserted that the company made "improper payments" to physicians "For prescribing its drugs." So, unlike some of the many settlements we have discussed which involved only financial improprieties, this one allegedly involved actions that corrupted physicians.

As we have noted previously, Transparency International defines corruption as "abuse of entrusted power for private gain." Physicians are entrusted to make decisions for individual patients for the patients' good. Accepting payments from a drug company to prescribe a particular good appear to be an abuse of such entrusted power, obviously for private gain. So the sorts of behavior that allegedly resulted in this settlement are particularly pernicious for medical professionalism, as well as for the good of patients.

Nonetheless, despite protestations that they are going to get tough, US law enforcement seems unwilling to hold any individual accountable for this sort of behavior. Granting individual impunity, though, seems to provide no deterrent against future bad behavior. 

For example, as we noted here, Merck KGaA had to pay a settlement last year of claims that its previous subsidiary, Mylan, reported falsely inflated claims.  That legal action also imposed no negative consequences on individuals.  This legal action had been in the works since at least 2007, but as noted above, the actions that lead to the current settlement continued through 2009. 

So, to repeat, repeat, repeat: we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.