Security and Privacy Considerations for Health IT Systems

I find the links at this piece from George Mason University, "Security and Privacy Considerations for Health IT Systems", and the opinions expressed within it of interest.

Emphases and [bracketed comments in red italics] mine:
First posted: 3 March 2010
Last updated: 26 March 2010

Preface

We seek to understand the nature and distribution of risks to security and privacy inherent in designing and deploying health information technology (HealthIT, eHealth; we use both terms interchangeably). We posit that achieving the appropriate balance of these risks and potential costs (to doctors, patients, hospitals, and the American taxpayer) requires careful, deliberate study to understand the nature of this new problem. [This is not occurring anywhere near the extent it needs to, and the absence of health IT industry regulation in the U.S. does not help; cf. 2009 National Research Council report on health IT summarized here - ed.]

Although health care reform in the United States is a highly-charged political issue, this Web page is not meant to be a political document or support a particular political point of view or legislative agenda. Instead, this page supplies a collection of information detailing the pitfalls and challenges involved in deploying a large-scale information infrastructure around the recording, tracking, and maintenance of patient and other medical information.

We are interested in the technical security and privacy issues that emerge from what we believe is a fundamentally different data acquisition and storage problem than previous industry efforts at record keeping for other forms of data. [Clinical computing and business computing are indeed different - ed.]

Our central hypothesis is that the government and private sector are rushing [you think? - ed.] into the deployment of eHealth technology without careful consideration of the design criteria necessary to ensure accurate and private data collection and without a realistic understanding of the costs of such a large software deployment. We certainly agree that improving the efficiency and efficacy of health care delivery while reducing the cost to the taxpayer and patients is an important and critical activity. Achieving this goal, however, demands a more careful approach than has heretofore been adopted.

Introduction

The application of information technology (especially back-office data storage applications) to various facets of medical care in the U.S.A. and other countries has often promised decreased cost, increased quality of health care, and no risk to privacy, among other benefits. Such belief in the reliability and integrity of information systems is an unwarranted leap of faith on behalf of legislators and the general public. [I have written similar words - ed.]

Designing health IT systems for medical environments requires careful, thoughtful analysis. Yet, Health IT (particularly EMR systems) are de facto seen as a solution to the problem of costs, waste, fraud, and needlessly duplicated medical tests. The White House web site comments on ARRA funding for EMR work: "The Recovery Act also invests $19 billion in computerized medical records that will help to reduce costs and improve quality while ensuring patients’ privacy."

The scientific community has largely been silent on this issue, although the political rhetoric can be quite intense. Yet, most every side of the health care debate currently raging in the US accepts without question the benefits of health IT while ignoring the potential pitfalls and downsides of such technology. [Again, this is a common theme here at Healthcare Renewal - ed.]

We use the terms "eHealth" and "Health IT" interchangeably. In large part, we consider the application of computer technology in medical devices and procedures (such as remote operating rooms, advances in digital imaging, etc.) as a related but separate area from our criticism of the management of healthcare and patient information. Those systems pose different risks to patients; we comment on them only insofar as their use is driven by analysis of data held in IT systems.

General Resources

  1. Patient Privacy Rights website (added 26 March 2010, G. Weaver)
  2. Scot Silverstein's Healthcare IT Failure and Difficulties Case Examples: Medical Informatics Perspectives on Clinical Information Technology (added 24 March 2010)
  3. Health Information Technology Reference Guide -BusinessWeek
  4. The Privacy Rights Website on Medical Privacy
  5. OpenMRS an open-source medical records system
  6. Another MRS
  7. Learning From Software Failures (frontmatter prefacing the IEEE Spectrum analysis of the FBI's Virtual Case File system) [PDF]
  8. Capability Maturity Model
  9. A workshop on Health Security and Privacy, sponsored by the USENIX Association

Risks to the Public Trust in Computer Professionals

Hastily undertaking the transformation of the information infrastructure behind health care systems with little forethought or oversight entails the risk of the public rejecting the expertise and credibility of the computing profession. Just because we could do something does not mean that we should. There is an imperative to study the new problems posed by large-scale EMR, particularly one of national scope or connectivity. [One reason is that the risks and benefits are unknown - ed.]

No imperative exists, however, to aggressively adopt the current generation of solutions that are little more than back-office data management applications dressed up with new terminology. [This description of health IT and the lack of imperative is excellent. Adopting national HIT prior to reasonable understanding of the possible problems and risks to patients is what I have referred to as "putting the cart before the horse"- ed.]

Furthermore, academics and scientific professionals have a conflict of interest in this area. Indeed, academics stand to benefit tremendously from money being spent on this area: schools (GMU included) are quick to set up research centers dealing with various aspects of medical IT and eHealth. While there is a need for careful research into the many security, privacy, and functionality aspects of large medical IT systems, academics can be in the uncomfortable position of being funded by government or corporate money and trying to formulate an unbiased opinion as to the quality and efficacy of the state of the art in eHealth systems and practices. [COI in biomedicine is another common topic addressed at HC Renewal - ed.]
  1. Dartmouth received $3 million under ARRA for an NSF-funded TISH program
  2. GMU's internally funded Mason Center for Health Information Technology
  3. Reflections on Trusting Trust (reputation is important in designing infrastructure)

Risks to Good Medicine

Health IT systems are not a panacea. Data models, systems, and user interfaces designed by computer scientists and professional software developers without much substantive input from health care professionals can lead to inefficiency and bad medicine [the common scenario for HIT development today - ed.], and risks loss of life or permanent injury to patients. [I, unfortunately, have family experience in that regard now - ed.]
  1. The Data Model That Nearly Killed me [PDF] [An excellent essay by a patient who is also a data modeling expert - ed.]
  2. The Dubious Promise of Digital Medicine [PDF]
  3. Slashdot: Why Digital Medical Records Are No Panacea 28 April 2009 [PDF]
  4. http://community.livejournal.com/therightfangirl/1142946.html

Data Leakage Models and Data Corruption Issues

One risk of large-scale EMR is a misunderstanding of the data loss dynamics of large public data systems. In addition, large databases tend to have errors: errors that are insidious and easily replicated due to the amount of automation present in such systems. It is an open question whether these errors pose a lesser or greater risk than errors due to bad handwriting on transcribed paper records. [The last point is controversial, but likely accurate - ed.]
  1. Your Medical Records Aren't Secure [PDF] (March 23, 2010)
  2. Why Cloud Storage Use Could Be Limited in Enterprises [PDF]
  3. Dan Geer on Back-of-the-envelope style estimates [link is to PDF]
  4. Woman Loses Job Due to Error in FBI Criminal Database [PDF]
  5. P2P Networks Rife With Sensitive Health Care Data, Researcher Warns
  6. Medical data leakage rampant on P2P networks [PDF]
  7. The previous two links refer to this study by researchers from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College
  8. A Framework for Health Care Information Assurance Policy and Compliance Communications of the ACM, 1 March 2010

Assessing the Cost of Large Software Projects and eHealth

Managing the design, construction, and delivery of a large software project is a complicated, fluid process. Government and industry can often fail in expensive and spectacular ways. [Indeed - ed.] Government agencies (particularly state and local government without in-house expertise), may play the role of uninformed client being sold digital snake oil at the expense of the taxpayer. Examples include the FBI's Virtual Case File system, AT&T's wireless database failure, and the Ontario eHealth scandal, among others listed below.
  1. Report: FBI wasted millions on 'Virtual Case File' CNN.com [PDF]
  2. The FBI's Upgrade That Wasn't: $170 Million Bought an Unusable Computer System by Dan Eggen and Griff Witte, Washington Post, 18 August 2006 [PDF]
  3. Who Killed the Virtual Case File? IEEE Spectrum [PDF]
  4. Project Management: AT&T Wireless Self-Destructs [PDF]
  5. Slashdot: Harvard Says Computers Don't Save Hospitals Money [PDF]
  6. Harvard study: Computers don't save hospitals money Computerworld, 30 November 2009 [PDF]
  7. The aforementioned Harvard Study
  8. EHealth scandal a $1B waste: auditor -CBC News, 7 October 2009 [PDF]
  9. Head of eHealth Ontario is fired amid contracts scandal, gets big package -CBC News, 7 June 2009 [PDF]

The Role of Health IT in Health Care Public Policy

  1. Health Care: The President's Proposal for Health Reform - whitehouse.gov [PDF]
  2. Obama's big idea: Digital health records -CNN.com, 12 January 2009 [PDF]
  3. Where's the HIT in HCR (Health Care Reform)? -ihealthbeat, 8 July 2009 [PDF]
  4. What Obama Means for Health Information Technology -HealthLeadersMedia, 11 November 2008 [PDF]
  5. The Healthcare Bill's Take on Technology -The Hill, 12 September 2009 [PDF]

I discovered this piece after someone clicked on the contained link to my Drexel University website. I find the thoughts here and the hyperlinks of great interest, forming yet another "primer" on the real world issues affecting health IT adoption.

-- SS

...THEM OR YOUR LYING EYES?

…THEM OR YOUR LYING EYES?

A few days ago I discussed stonewalling by the American Psychiatric Association over charges that they were partners in a ghostwritten textbook. The issue resonated with many people, including Daniel Carlat, John Nardo, the POGO blog, Alison Bass, Ed Silverman, and others. The APA has not seen its way clear to releasing key documents that might clear up the charges. By stonewalling, the APA just does more damage to its image and credibility. They come across as uninterested in transparency, and they appear to be fighting a rearguard action to defend the indefensible.

What kind of key documents could the APA have released? In our letter last January we suggested several, including the contract involving the American Psychiatric Press, the medical communications company (Scientific Therapeutics Information, Inc. or STI), the grant-giving drug company, the professional writers, and the nominal authors of the allegedly ghostwritten book. What might the contract have told us? Well, it probably looks a lot like this contract, which involves the same medical communications company, the same drug company, and one of the same professional writers, Sally Laden. It was developed right around the same time as the textbook was planned, and it is for a ghostwritten journal article promoting the infamous Paxil Study 329. Look carefully at this contract and you will be in no doubt about who did the essential work of writing and framing the article or about whether the corporation had control over the content. Now ask yourselves, if the contract for the textbook doesn’t look like this then why ever would the APA want to suppress it? That behavior just makes people conclude that the contract for the textbook does look like this contract and that the APA knows it has plenty to hide.

A first principle of cover-ups and stonewalling is that everyone needs to be on the same page with the cover story. When they are not, the façade collapses and the actors come across like the Three Stooges, all heading for the door at the same time. Today, thanks to the sleuthing of Phyllis Vine at Mental Illness Watch, we saw the stooges exposed in their clumsiness. Phyllis Vine discovered material on the corporate website of STI that has them featuring the textbook in the ‘portfolio’ that aims to attract new business to the company. Juxtapose that with the adjacent claim that STI’s skills are to "develop, write, edit, and submit a high-quality article to your target audience." Now is there any doubt about how this game is played? Now is there any doubt about whether the APA has come clean?

Well, if there were any remaining doubt it has been removed by another development: All the materials describing the STI ‘portfolio’ have been removed from the company’s website. Fortunately, Phyllis Vine had captured it here, and so did Daniel Carlat through the Wayback machine. It was picked up some more by Mickey Nardo today. It looks like the APA is going to have more explaining to do.

As the old Groucho Marx line goes, Who you gonna believe, them or your lying eyes?

Bernard Carroll

What's Killing Pharma, With Some Lessons For Hospital IT

An excellent essay on the pathologies killing the pharmaceutical industry is at this link: http://www.eyesopen.com/en/blog/what-is-really-killing-pharma .

The essay talks about mismanagement, marketing over R&D, management fads, ill-informed managers and many other issues we've discussed in one context or another here at Healthcare Renewal.

This paragraph in particular struck my eye for several reasons:

... Another good one [reason pharma is dying - ed.]: empowering IT departments to make scientists use the same infrastructure as the guy at the front desk. Rather than see that scientists often have different computing needs than other parts of the business, IT demands obeisance to the corporate norm. In doing so, they hinder the kind of innovation (e.g., Linux, GPU solutions) that used to regularly occur because scientists are quite computer literate, thank you. Instead, IT departments make it impossible for competent people to manage their own resources. They create obstacles instead of removing them. Machine was made for Man, not Man for the Machine.

The paragraph struck me because:

  • Replace "scientists" with "doctors" and you have defined a major problem with health IT In the healthcare delivery sector.
  • Finally, this bon mot is extremely apropos to both environments: "Machine was made for Man, not Man for the Machine."
Sixty years into the "computer revolution", pharma, healthcare, and the IT industry itself have not learned this simple lesson.

I have to believe in 2011 this phenomenon is at least in part due to an abundance of powerful computers relative to the supply of humans in these industries with densely-interconnected gray matter.

I think the author of the aforementioned piece agrees. He concludes:

... The film industry long ago recognized that what is important is talent. No one can predict what will be a blockbuster (drug or movie), but Hollywood has at least recognized that movie-making is a talent-based industry. Perhaps today’s pharma chiefs need to see themselves as latter-day studio heads—I’m sure they’d love that!—and come to the same conclusions. Define the vision, get and keep the right people, stop making it harder for talented people to do their jobs, give them the time and resources to be creative. Then maybe, just maybe, they would start curing pharma.


-- SS

BLOGSCAN: Circling the Wagons Around the RUC

On the Care and Cost Blog, Brian Klepper suggested that the defenders of the RUC (RBRVS Update Committee) are getting worried.  He showed that a letter signed by medical specialty societies, but not the major societies that represent generalists, deployed logical fallacies in support of the secretive committee dominated by proceduralists that de facto sets payments to physicians by the US Medicare system, and which seems largely responsible for the gulf between payments for procedures and for primary and "cognitive" care.  His summation:
The arguments mounted by the AMA and the specialty societies are really nothing more than a vested industry’s efforts to preserve the status quo at all costs. (Think Wall Street’s apologists in this year’s Oscar-winning documentary, Inside Job.) But this approach has brought health care and the US economy to the brink of economic catastrophe.


Averting disaster will require an approach that dampens or bypasses the voices of the advisors who got us here, and strengthens the voice of primary care, which overwhelming data show produce better care at lower costs.