Showing posts with label hospitals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hospitals. Show all posts

The Case of the Vanishing Graduate Medical Education Funds

While primary care falters in the US, those who teach it seem to feel increasingly poverty stricken.  Now it appears that one reason for this is an amazing example of multiple failures of transparency and accountability.  Let me work through it, begging your pardon for a little bit of "inside baseball," medical education style.  The results suggest how we desperately need some medical disciples of Sherlock Holmes.

Background

My personal experience and increasing data suggests that most medical school faculty believe that their teaching is not valued by their institutions because teaching brings in no external funds.  In 2004, Dr Catherine DeAngelis, then the editor of JAMA, wrote "few medical schools provide adequate, if any, reimbursement for teaching time."(1)  (See this 2005 post.)   This seems absurd on its face, since what are medical schools for if it is not to provide teaching. 

However, there is evidence of this mission-hostile behavior.  In 2007, we quoted from a revealing interview with Dr Lee Goldman, Executive Vice President for Health and Biomedical Sciences at Columbia University,(2) who stated that "taxpayers," faculty who "generate more [money] than they cost," are valued most, and implied that faculty who focus on teaching are regarded as "welfare recipients," who bring in less external funding, and are valued least.  In 2010, we noted the results of a large-scale survey presented by Dr Linda Pololi in which 51% of faculty felt that the administration only valued them for the money that they brought in, and half felt that their institutions did not value teaching.(3)

Yet while faculty seem to believe that educational institutions receive little if any money to pay for teaching, it is not clear why the believe something so counter intuitive, and it is less clear what money actually goes to pay for medical education.

US Government Funding for Graduate Medical Education

However, several recent publications affirm that actually a lot of money goes towards one important form of medical education, yet the specifics of the money flows are shrouded in secrecy.  In the May, 2012, SGIM Forum, Dr Mark Liebow and colleagues summarized some of what is known about federal support of graduate medical education, that is, education of interns, residents, and other house officers.(4)  There are two streams of money that flow from Medicare to US hospitals:
Direct GME (DGME) payments help hospitals pay the salaries of residents, teaching faculty, and support staff. DGME is the product of three numbers: a per resident amount that varies by hospital, adjusted annually for inflation; the number of residents in the hospital (capped for each hospital at 1997 levels); and the fraction of discharges from the hospital that are Medicare beneficiaries. The Indirect Medical Education (IME) payment is a percentage amount added on to each DRG payment. The percentage is calculated via a complex formula (the only US statute containing an exponent!), where the key factor is the ratio of interns/residents to beds (IRB ratio).

These two streams are of considerable size:
Of the $9.2 billion Medicare paid for GME in 2010, $3 billion was for DGME and $6.2 billion for IME. The money is paid to hospitals sponsoring training programs rather than to the training programs or other hospitals where training occurs. While about 1,100 hospitals receive GME payments, 66% goes to the 200 hospitals that have the largest numbers of residents.

So, the 200 largest hospitals get about $2 billion in direct GME money (and presumably about another $4 billion in indirect money). This averages then to about $10 million DGME and $20 million indirect GME per hospital.

Thus, teaching, at least the teaching of interns, residents, and other house-staff does pay, and much more than trivial amounts. (Note that these amounts are not for teaching of medical students, which ought to be supported by other funding streams.)

Why then do faculty think that teaching does not bring in any money?

The GME Money Vanishes

An article by Dr Saima I Chaudhry and colleagues in the American Journal of Medicine begins to explain, although the explanations are found between the lines.(5)

First of all, while the graduate medical education money is paid by the government to the hospitals, the government does not publish what it pays to individual hospitals:
It has been previously reported that the amount of GME funding individual hospitals receive is not publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,....

The government also does not hold the hospitals accountable for how they spend this money, nor for the quantity or quality of education they supply in exchange for it.

Remarkably, Chaudhry et al imply that that the people who run graduate medical education teaching programs also may not know how much money their hospitals receive from the government to fund their programs. The introduction to their article noted:
It is unclear how much program directors know about the amount and flow of DME funds to their programs. Program directors' beliefs about the transparency of funding to their programs, or their desire to influence how funds are distributed to them, also are unknown.

The article reported on a survey of internal medicine residency program directors which asked about "their knowledge of D[G]ME funding for their programs, the transparency with which funds are distributed to them, and their desire to influence this disbursement." The researchers sent surveys to 372 member programs, representing 97.1% of all US internal medicine residencies. They got 268 responses, a 72.0% response rate.

The main results were that only 159/268 (59.3%) of program directors had tried to find out how much DGME money their programs received, and of those, only 84 (52.8% of those enquiring, but only 31.3% of all respondents) actually knew how much money their programs got.

Of the 92 program directors who did not even try to discover how much money their programs received, approximately 21% said that "no one would tell me," 21% said that the "information would be inaccurate," 14% said they "don't know who to ask," and 2% were "afraid to ask."

Summary

US medical school faculty, especially those in primary care, increasingly feel pressured to perform activities that they perceive brings in money from external sources. They tend to believe that their own teaching somehow does not bring in any money, and that their careers will fail if they do not put more emphasis on other activities that the institution views as more profitable.

However, literally billions of US government dollars go to support the education of house staff, including the salaries of faculty who teach interns and residents, who probably are the majority of physician faculty. Faculty probably do not know this, because the government does not publish the amounts given to individual hospitals, nor demand of the hospitals any accountability for how they spend the money they receive.

Presumably, the top executives of each hospital know how much money the government gives them. Nonetheless, the majority of physician leaders of residency programs are never told these amounts, apparently because their hospital executives kept the amounts secret. Many of those educators who have tried to find out the figures were unsuccessful. Some did not even try to find out based on beliefs that their attempts would be unsuccessful, any amounts they discovered would be inaccurate, the people who knew the amounts were hidden, or that it would be dangerous to their careers to even try.

Thus billions of dollars of money flowing from the government to fund graduate medical education seems to have vanished in an amazing example of widespread deficiencies in accountability and transparency.

There are many people who blame government for many social ills. In this case, one can blame the US Congress for not writing a law that makes the money flows transparent and hospitals accountable for providing good educational value for the money provided. One can also blame the executive branch, particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for not making the money flows and the values received for them transparent.

There are a few people, including this author, who also blame the leadership of health care organizations for many of the problems besetting health care. In this case, one can blame top leadership, presumably CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of hospitals for hiding the amounts of money they receive from Medicare to finance graduate medical education. One can also blame the physician leaders of residency programs for not insisting that they know the true sources of financial support for their programs, obtain budgets that reflect this support, and recognition that their faculty really do bring in external funds for their teaching of house staff (and are thus valuable "taxpayers" in Dr Goldman's parlance.)

It is amazing that such amounts of money have been flowing for years mostly in secret. The secrecy has fueled incorrect, and in retrospect, bizarre ideas about the funding of medical education, and the value of medical educators to their institutions. This secrecy, in turn, has helped suppress the morale of medical educators, support the control of managers of health care professionals, and distort the flow of money within academic institutions and to compensation for certain favored individuals.

Would our dysfunctional health care system not be better off if we demanded transparency and accountability from its leaders?  In particular, the US government should make payments to hospitals for graduate medical education completely transparent, and develop a system to hold these hospitals accountable for how they spend the money.  Meanwhile, top leaders of hospitals receiving this money should make the amounts transparent, first to the people who are supposed to be doing the education that the money pays for, and to the public at large.  This would allow those running the relevant educational programs to develop reasonable and realistic budgets, to treat their faculty with respect, and to demonstrate what value they provide for the money received. 
The ongoing anechoic effect, and related deception and secrecy fostered by leaders in health care are major reasons our health care system is so dysfunctional, that costs are so high, and access and quality so poor.  True health care reform would ensure health care leaders put the mission before their personal enrichment, and act ethically with accountability, transparency, and honesty. 
References
1.   DeAngelis CD. Professors not professing. JAMA 2004; 292: 1060-1.  Link here.
2.  Goldman L, Halm EA.  A view from the top: general internal medicine from the perspective of a chair and dean.  SGIM Forum, April, 2007.  Link here.
3.  Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E.  Faculty Values in the Culture of Academic Medicine: Findings of a National Faculty Survey. Link here.
4.  Liebow M, Jaeger J, Schwartz MD. How does Medicare pay for graduate medical education? SGIM Forum, May, 2012.  Link here.
5. Chaudhry SI, Khanijo S, Halvorsen AJ, McDonald FS,Patel K. Accountability and transparency in graduate medical education expenditures. Am J Med 2012; 125: 517-522. Link here.

An Example of How the Complex Takes Control - A Board Dominated by Hired Managers Levitates Its Hired CEO's Pay

The Indianapolis Star published the latest story about anti-gravity health care executive compensation.  The report emphasized how the largest hospital systems in the metropolitan area raised CEO pay faster than any reasonable metric:
CEO pay is up, sharply in some cases, at Indianapolis' four large hospital groups, as the systems have grown and dumped more responsibilities on their top leaders.

Total pay for those CEOs rose anywhere from 15 percent to 53 percent from 2008 to 2010. While experts say the pay is in line with executive compensation at other large hospital groups, the rate of the increases far outpaces the minimal wage gains that area health-care workers (1.7 percent) and hourly workers (3.1 percent) have seen over the same time.

The rising CEO pay comes at one of the shakiest financial periods ever for hospitals, as they struggle with cuts in reimbursements for care from federal Medicare and Medicaid programs and private insurers.

CEO Pay Up More than Revenue

Pay at specific health care systems also rose faster than revenue. At the Indiana University Health System:
At the top of the best-paid list: IU Health's President and Chief Executive Daniel F. Evans Jr., who pulled down $2.08 million in compensation in 2010, up 17 percent from 2008. Subtracting Evans' retirement payouts, which vary year to year, his base pay jumped 19 percent since 2008.

However,
From 2008 to 2010, IU Health has seen revenue grow 10 percent to $2.46 billion,...

At St Vincent Hospital and Health Care
Close behind comes Vincent Caponi, CEO of St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, who took in $1.86 million in 2009-10, a two-year jump of 44 percent, or 64 percent when retirement is removed.

However,
Revenue over the two years rose 28 percent at St. Vincent,...

At Franciscan Alliance,
Robert Brody of Franciscan Alliance earned $1.27 million in 2010 (53 percent more than in 2008),...

However, over that period revenue only rose 17%.

At Community Health Network,
Bryan A. Mills, the relatively new CEO of Community Health Network, received $1.35 million, or 15 percent more than his predecessor, William Corley, collected in 2008. (Corley retired in 2009.)
while revenue only rose 4%.

The Usual Talking Points

At this point, it should come as no surprise that hospital leadership trotted out the same old talking points to account for the ever upward trajectory of CEO pay as used in other areas and to account for the pay of leaders of other kinds of health care organizations (look here). These included...

We Pay What Everyone Else Pays

It was easy to find a professional compensation consultant to repeat this one:
Jim Otto, senior principal in Atlanta for the Hay Group, a consultant on executive benefits, said pay to top hospital CEOs in Indianapolis appears in line with rising compensation, including retirement benefits and bonuses, being paid nationally to most large-system hospital executives.

CEOs Work Hard and Are Brilliant

So we read:
At IU Health, formerly Clarian Health Partners, where Evans has been CEO since 2002, 'The system's grown significantly. It makes us think twice about the difficulty of running such a system. We literally cover the entire state of Indiana. And much of that has been under Dan's oversight,' said Charles Golden, an IU Health board member and chair of its compensation committee.

Also,
Golden says Evans 'has done a really superb job. Almost everything favorable to our system has been positive in his time.'

Here is the version pertaining to St Vincent's
Caponi 'is on an airplane and out of town a good bit, running a much bigger area' for Ascension, said Bill Estes, chairman of St. Vincent's board. 'That's the way we justify (higher CEO pay) and feel comfortable with that.'

High Pay is Needed to Attract Competent, if not Brilliant People

From Mr Otto, the compensation consultant:
Large hospital groups make certain they pay similar to their peers to remain competitive.

One reason for rising pay, Otto says: 'These aren't easy jobs. They are not easy to fill. The candidate pool isn't terribly large.'

Furthermore, Mr Golden, from the IU Board, added,
'Unless you want to default to mediocrity, I suppose you can do that (cut CEO pay),' he said. 'But I don't think that's where we are going. I don't think these (hospital) systems will get any easier to manage.'

Talking Points Sans Justification

As in previous cases, no one that reporter Jeff Swiatek could find provided any specifics to back up these talking points. It is striking that those who stewarded all the major hospital systems in this one area
felt the need to raise executive pay substantially faster than the rate of rise of revenue, that is from 1.7 times to 3.75 times the rate of revenue rise.

Why Are Hospital Boards So Nice to CEOs?

In the interests of full disclosure, I noticed this article because reporter Jeff Swiatek chose yours truly, plus fellow blogger Dr Howard Brody (look here) to comment for it.
'Whenever the nonprofit sector starts acting more like the for-profit sector, I start to get worried,' said Dr. Howard Brody, director of the Institute for the Medical Humanities. 'It just becomes crony capitalism. If one executive gets paid $3 million instead of $1 million, then every executive wants $3 million. It just becomes a vicious cycle of inflation of CEO benefits.'

Also, I suggested:
Put more noncorporate members on hospital boards because they'd be less inclined to endorse large compensation packages that are more typical of for-profit companies.

'Boards are populated by wealthy executives, who themselves are getting increasing compensation, rather than by community representatives or patient representatives,' Poses said.
Could the Composition of the Board Explain Excess Deference to the CEO?

I made the above comments after hearing approximations of the compensation given out by the hospital systems, but without any knowledge of the composition of the boards that approved that compensation. I am guessing that Dr Brody also was not told anything about board composition when he suggested the possibility of crony capitalism.

However, now that the article is out, I think it makes sense to look at the composition of at least one of the boards involved. I chose IU Health, since it is the largest of the systems, paid the most to its CEO, and was kind enough to list board members' brief biographies on a web-page.  Here they are, listed with their primary affiliations, and some notable other affiliations.

- Judge Sarah Evans Barker, former federal district court judge.
Dr D Craig Brater, "dean of the Indiana University School of Medicine and director of IU Medical Center." Also on  the Board of Advisors of Spring Mill Venture Partners, "an early stage venture capital firm focused on investing in high-growth information technology and life sciences companies;" recipient of consulting and travel money from Pfizer (per ProPublica); and who was listed as having "a financial interest/relationship or affiliation in the form of: Consultant for AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals; BioGen, Inc.; Forest Laboratories; Merck & Co., Inc.; Pfizer Inc.; and Pharmacia and Upjohn Company" per CMECorner.
- William R Cast, "CEO of NoMore Clipboard, an online, patient-controlled personal health record management system."
- Thomas W Chapman, "president and CEO of The HSC Foundation in Washington, DC, the parent corporation for two subsidiaries, The HSC Pediatric Center and Health Services for Children with Special Needs. He was previously senior associate vice president for Network Development and Professor of Health Services Management and Policy at George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, DC."
- Bishop Michael J Coyner, "Bishop of the Indiana Area United Methodist Church"
- J Scott Davison, "chief financial officer for OneAmerica and its affiliated companies," and member of the board of directors for Indiana Bond Bank."
- Daniel F Evans Jr - CEO of IU Health, also member of the board of Lakeland Financial Corp, (per Bloomberg)
- Charles E Golden, "retired from Eli Lilly and Company in 2006 as executive vice president and CFO and a member of the board of directors. He was previously a corporate vice president of General Motors...." He is also currently on the boards of Unilever, which makes health care related products, and Hill-Rom, which makes medical devices and supplies.
- David W Goodrich, "retired in 2005 as president and CEO of Central Indiana Corporate Partnership, Inc."
- V William Hunt, "chairman of Hunt Capital Partners, LLC, a venture capital and consulting firm based in Indianapolis. Until August 2001, he was the vice chairman and president of ArvinMeritor Inc...."
- Dr James E Lingeman, "long-standing member of the IU Health Methodist Hospital medical staff," but also according to a 2009 American Urologic Association Education and Research paper, Consultant or Advisor to, and Meeting Participant or Lecturer for Boston Scientific Corp and Lumenis, scientific investigator for Boston Scientific and Olympus, investor in Beck Analytical Laboratories and Midstate Mobile Lithotripsy, and having "Other" financial relationships with Beck and Midstate.
- Angela Barron McBride, " distinguished professor and university dean emerita at Indiana University School of Nursing"
- Michael A McRobbie, "Indiana University President," also on the board of OneAmerica (look here).
- Anne Nobles, "senior vice president for Enterprise Risk Management and chief ethics and compliance officer for Eli Lilly and Company."

When considering the composition of this board, note that members of non-profit organizations' boards generally are said to have three duties, as per BoardSource:
- The Duty of Care: "a board member owes the duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she makes a decision as a steward of the organization."
- The Duty of Loyalty: "a board member must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization. This means that a board member can never use information obtained as a member for personal gain, but must act in the best interests of the organization."
- The Duty of Obedience: "The duty of obedience requires board members to be faithful to the organization's mission. They are not permitted to act in a way that is inconsistent with the central goals of the organization."

The Duties of Care and Obedience require board members to exercise prudent and reasonable supervision over hired managers, and provide these managers reasonable pay and incentives.  However, boards dominated by hired managers may put the interests of such managers ahead of their organizations' missions. 

So of the 14 members of the IU Health board, 8 are current or retired top level corporate executives or corporate board members, 4 of which have such leadership positions at financial service companies, (two at OneAmerica). In addition, 5, including 4 apparently ex-officio members, had or have top leadership positions in academic institutions. The board also included one Methodist Bishop and one federal judge. All but two board members are thus current or former top level hired managers of for-profit corporations or non-profit organizations.

Thus this board is largely populated by executives who are likely to be wealthy. Thus it is similar to many other boards of health care corporations (e.g., look here and here) and non-profit organizations  (e.g., look herehere, and here) which we have discussed.  It stands to reason that boards dominated by hired managers will feel comfortable with and look kindly on the hired managers whom they are supposed to supervise, and view their compensation sympathetically.  Thus such boards may not exercise the Duties of Care and Obedience.

Furthermore, the Duty of Loyalty requires boards not to be affected by conflicts of interest. 
 
However, many of the IU Health board members have financial relationships that could be considered conflicts of interest. Two have or had executive positions at the same pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly, one of whom also was on the board of medical device and supply company. In addition, both of the doctors on the board have or had significant disclosed financial relationships with drug, device, or biotechnology firms.  Again, it is like other boards affected by such conflicts that we have discussed.  Again, such boards may not exercise the Duty of Loyalty.
 
Summary
 
Combined with other examples of the composition of boards of for-profit health care corporations, and non-profit health care organizations, the latest example suggests the complex has taken control.  Nearly every board we have scrutinized is dominated by hired managers of other companies, and salted with conflicts of interest.  It seems likely that such boards will put the interests of hired managers ahead of those of the shareholders of for-profit corporations, and ahead of the missions of non-profit organizations. 
 
The complex that has taken control looks like a confederation of hired managers.  In 2003, five years before the fall of Lehman Brothers ushered in the global financial collapse, John C Bogle warned of the "grotesque transformation" of capitalism into an oligarchy of hired managers:
The root causes of the disease in our system are deep, and the remedies that are required to cure it will not be easy to come by. For what we have witnessed in the failure of corporate governance in America has been, as journalist William Pfaff described it, 'a pathological mutation in capitalism.' He was right on the mark. The classic system—owners capitalism—had been based on a dedication to serving the interests of the corporation’s owners, maximizing the return on their capital investment. But a new system developed—managers capitalism—in which 'the corporation came to be run to profit its managers, in complicity if not conspiracy with accountants and the managers of other corporations.' Why did it happen? 'Because,' in Mr. Pfaff’s words, 'the markets had so diffused corporate ownership that no responsible owner exists. This is morally unacceptable, but also a corruption of capitalism itself.'
This plague of managers' capitalism seems not to have spared health care, and to have infected the non-profit as well as public for-profit sphere.

To stave off the coming dystopia, we must return the control of for-profit corporations, including health care corporations, to their owners, and stewardship of non-profit organizations to those who will put their missions ahead of self-interest.

The Bloat Continues: More Tales of Non-Profit Hospital Executive Compensation

While unemployment remains high, and mortgage foreclosures continue in the US, nothing seems to stop the rise of health care costs, lead by compensation for top health care leaders. So, it is time once again for a round-up of inflated executive compensation at non-profit and government hospital systems.  We will describe the bloat in order of the appearance of the information in public.

Cincinnati

The December, 2011, the Cincinnati Business Courier tabulated the pay of the best compensated hospital employees, and discussed the results in an accompanying article.  By my count, 19 local hospital employees made more than $1 million in 2010.  These included 6 system CEO, 4 division CEOs, 5 chief level executives or vice presidents, 1 clinical department chair, and 3 doctors.  The top compensation went to Kenneth Hanover, CEO of Health Alliance/ UC Health, $2,799,338. Three others made more than $2 million.

Western New York

In January, 2012, Buffalo Business First reported:
The top hospital administrators in Western New York took home more than $53 million in compensation during 2010, with four executives earning $1 million-plus paydays.

Hospital presidents and chief executives at the region’s two largest health systems were among the top earners, with James Kaskie, president and CEO of Kaleida Health , earning $2.36 million; and Joseph McDonald, president and CEO at Catholic Health , earning nearly $1.1 million.

Kaskie’s compensation, as well as Kaleida executives Connie Vari, Robert Nolan and Margaret Paroski, included a deferred retirement plan payout. All four were among the top five earners for 2010, the most recent year for which complete data is available.

The life of a top hospital executive near Buffalo was not quite as plush as in Cincinnati. Only 4 made more than $1 million, including the CEO, Chief Medical Officer/ Executive Vice President, and Chief Operating Officer of Kaleida Health, and the CEO of Catholic Health System. Eleven more executives got more than $500,000.

North Carolina

It was a very good year for executives from some of the state's biggest health care systems, per a February, 2012 article in the Charlotte Observer.
Carolinas HealthCare System paid its CEO $4.2 million in 2011, $523,000 more than the year before, as the system celebrated a profitable year and met all of its systemwide goals, according to hospital officials.

Chief Executive Officer Michael Tarwater, 58, who has led the $6 billion public hospital system for 10 years, received a base salary of about $1 million, two bonuses totaling $2.5 million, and other compensation, including retirement and health benefits, of about $700,000.

That represents a 9 percent increase in base salary and a 14 percent overall increase compared to 2010, when Tarwater's salary was $986,172 and total compensation was $3.7 million.

Meanwhile, at Novant Health,
The most recent compensation figures for Novant executives are from 2010. In that year, Novant's CEO Paul Wiles, 64, received total compensation of $3.2 million, including his salary of $1 million, a bonus of about $837,000, and $1.37 million in other income, including retirement and health benefits.

Wiles retired at the end of 2011 and was succeeded by Carl Armato, who was previously chief operating officer for Novant.

A data table within the article showed that there were 10 employees, all executives, at Carolinas Healthcare System in 2011, and 6, again all executives, at Novant Health in 2010, who got more than $1 million in compensation.

Why did the Carolinas CEO warrant a multi-million dollar pay package? One of his employees endeavored to explain,
'We've had extremely good performance,' said Debra Plousha Moore, the system's chief of human resources. 'All performance goals this year were either met or exceeded.'
Why the credit for that performance should not be spread amongst more hospital employees, especially those who actually took care of patients, she did not explain.
Northern New York City Suburbs

In February, 2012, LoHud.com reported:
Eight executives from 15 Lower Hudson Valley hospitals received more than $1 million in salary, bonuses, benefits and other pay in 2010 at a time when the state struggled to control health-care costs.

The details included:
Three executives received more in total compensation than Westchester Medical Center CEO Michael Israel, who earned $1.3 million and oversees a hospital that’s more than twice the size of other facilities in the region.

Also,
The highest-paid hospital employees include White Plains Hospital CEO Jon Schandler with $1.6 million in total compensation, Dr. Edward Lundy at Good Samaritan Hospital in Suffern with $1.48 million and Edward Dinan, CEO of Lawrence Hospital in Bronxville, with $1.41 million.

Others in the million-dollar range include John Federspiel, president of Hudson Valley Hospital Center in Cortlandt; Joel Seligman, CEO of Northern Westchester Hospital in Mount Kisco; and Keith Safian, CEO of Phelps Memorial Hospital Center in Sleepy Hollow. A year earlier, Federspiel received a compensation package of nearly $2 million due partly to an $800,000 deferred compensation payout.

The average CEO compensation rose 13 percent from 2009, to $939,751.

Ten hospitals paid $7.7 million in bonuses to top executives, an increase of 15 percent over 2009. White Plains Hospital alone distributed $2.1 million in bonuses, including $650,000 to Dr. Jesus Jaile-Marti, chief of neonatology, and $575,000 to Schandler.

This article highlighted the contrast between compensation for executives and for employees who provide front line care:
The high salaries also come as hospitals pressure many employees for wage freezes, rising insurance costs and watered-down pensions, said Deborah Elliott, a nurse and deputy executive officer of the New York State Nurses Association, a statewide union representing nurses at Sound Shore, Mount Vernon, St. John’s Riverside, St. Joseph’s and Nyack hospitals as well as Westchester Medical Center.

'It never ceases to amaze me that we sit at the bargaining table with these executives who are making $1 million and they give us such a hard time about a half-percent increase for a nurse who is making $63,000,' Elliott said. 'It’s galling.'
Again, contrast that one half percent with the average chief executive increase of 13%.

While it is a rare hospital that would disparage the performance of its dedicated nurses and physicians, somehow executive talent seems to matter more. For example, here is how Hudson Valley Hospital Center president John Federspiel's compensation was justified by his board chair:
Edward B. MacDonald Jr., chairman of Hudson Valley Hospital Center’s board of directors, said Federspiel deserves his paycheck. The hospital has earned a profit for 22 of the 25 years that Federspiel has been at the helm and has expanded both its services and payroll in that time, he said.

'He’s the best administrator, planner and motivator I have ever had the privilege to work with,' MacDonald said. 'I wish I could pay him more.'
Again, why the CEO, but not the nurses and doctors deserves the credit for the hospital's performance was not stated.
Summary

It all gets so tedious, doesn't it? CEOs of all but the smallest non-profit hospitals now seem entitled to at least $1 million a year. At larger systems, multiple executives per system seem entitled to that level of compensation, and CEOs may get multiple millions a year. Yet these are ostensibly non-profit organizations dedicated or providing care to their communities, and often to serving the poor. Thus the health care bubble continues to inflate, and executives are ever more distracted by money, and seem less focused on mission.

Note that reporting of this ever rising compensation seems to be becoming more perfunctory as the results seem more routine (and tedious). Two of the four articles noted above did not provide any justifications for the high pay, while two only trotted out brief versions of the "our CEO is so brilliant" meme.

As I said in December, in a health care system with ever rising costs, declining access, and stagnant quality, we no longer can tolerate the perverse incentives generated by unaccountably high compensation to top executives. As long as top executives continue their sense of "self-entitlement," and can continue their current management practices reinforced by ever rising pay checks, expect poor leadership to undermine any attempts to improve health care. Tired repetitions of the usual rationales, that the CEOs are brilliant and hard-working, and that their compensation is mandated by the market do not make these rationales true.

We need health care leadership that has compassion for the increasing hardships that their patients have to endure, and that puts doing the right thing for patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.

A New Low - A Hospital CEO Got a "Golden Parachute" for A Merger that Never Occurred

We recently posted about how top hospital managers are often the first to benefit from mergers and acquisitions, which once again have become fashionable in management circles.  Now it appears that top executives can benefit even from failed mergers, as reported by the Daytona Beach (Florida) News-Journal,
Five months after Bert Fish Medical Center's failed merger, one board member said he was surprised to learn payments are still being made toward the $1 million buyout of the former hospital CEO.

Hospital board member Joe Benedict said he didn't know former hospital Chief Executive Officer Bob Williams, who steered the board into the illegal deal with Adventist Health System, is due to receive his $289,000-a-year salary until 2014 –– paid through the publicly owned hospital.

At the time the merger was announced, a memorandum of understanding with Williams became public and showed the deal had triggered a three-year buyout clause in Williams' contract. Starting July 1, 2010, the Adventist agreement paid him his salary for three years, as his contract required, plus seven months and eight days –– a deal worth $1 million and benefits.

'That man has got away with a lot more than he should have,' said Benedict, a former County Council member, explaining that he considers Williams as responsible for the failed merger as Jim Heekin, the board's former attorney.

These payments were made to the former CEO despite the cost of the failure of the merger:
The hospital district incurred $3.4 million in administrative and legal fees as a result.

Apparently, there are allegations that the merger failed because former CEO Williams agreed to keep the board meetings of this public hospital secret, which was illegal:
The hospital board has voted to pursue a legal malpractice lawsuit against Heekin, of the Orlando firm Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, for his advice to keep the public out of talks about merging the New Smyrna Beach hospital with a partner. The 21 closed meetings that were held over 16 months were called 'so much darkness for so long' they couldn't be cured, according to a ruling earlier this year from Circuit Judge Richard Graham, who threw out the merger.

Also,
Williams is quoted in transcripts of the closed meetings telling board members not to tell anyone Adventist had been chosen as Bert Fish's partner

Other contractual provisions for golden parachutes exist, but have yet to be activated:
Benedict said he's still hopeful he can undo other buyout clauses in hospital contracts he believes obligate the hospital to pay more than is allowed, under state law, for the departure of Bert Fish Medical Center administrators. According to the current contracts, provided to the News-Journal, the hospital's current CEO, chief financial officer and chief of nursing must be paid 24 months' salary should they be dismissed from their positions through no fault of their own. Their departures could be a possibility if Bert Fish were to seek another merger partner who doesn't want to keep them on.

The contracts were executed June 30. On July 1, a new state law went into effect that limits the buyout of public employees to 20 months.

Summary

So, a hospital CEO had a contract that made him eligible to begin receiving "golden parachute" payments just because a merger was in process, and these payments could not be stopped even though the merger was declared illegal, and hence never occurred. We noted recently that CEOs and other top officials of health care organizations are often the first to benefit financially from mergers and acquisitions, even when such transactions to not prove so beneficial to the affected institutions, much less patients' and the public's health in the long run. Here is a case in which a CEO could get extra money just because a merger was contemplated. This is some sort of new record for health care leaders personally profiting from their insider positions.

There has been growing public outrage about how ordinary people who play by the rules are disadvantaged in today's economy, while insiders profit from their positions. There ought to be equal outrage in health care over its version of this pheonomenon.

As long as health care leaders can continue to put their self-interest ahead of the health care mission in this way, is it any wonder that health care costs continue to rise while access and quality suffer? When will would be health care reformers realize that to truly reform health care, we will have to reform health care leadership? We need health care leaders who understand and uphold the mission, are accountable for how well they do so, and whose incentives depend on how they do so. We do not need leaders who put their self-interest first. Right now, however, that seeems to be the leadership we have.

Will Hired Executives Let "Healing Prevail Over Profit?" - Questions from Public and Catholic Non-Profit Health Systems

Hospital - noun, 1.  a charitable institution for the needy, aged, infirm or young  2.  an institution where the sick or injured are given medical or surgical care, Merriam-Webster


             - noun.  1.  an institution providing medical and surgical treatment and nursing care for sick or injured people, Oxford Dictionary

Two recent NY Times articles raise concerns that changes in leadership may cause hospitals to stray from their original purpose. 

Cook County Health and Hospitals System

The first NY Times article discussed leadership of Cook County Health and Hospitals System (in the Chicago, IL area). This is a public health system whose mission was traditionally "to serve Cook County's neediest patients." The management of the system, however, is now increasingly in the hands of paid consultants. For example, until recently, its COO (chief operating officer) was:
Mr. [Tony] Tedeschi, [who] like other of the system’s recent top managers, works for the Sibery Group, which has had contracts with the system to provide temporary executive talent.

Furthermore, his successor was
Ms. [Carol] Schneider, whose contract runs through December, works for the Washington Group Ltd., a consulting company that provides administrative help to the system.

Furthermore,
PricewaterhouseCoopers has a three-year, $50 million contract calling for it to save the system $300 million or bring in the equivalent in new revenue.

Not to mention,
consultants from the Sibery Group, which is based in Oak Brook, [were appointed] to top management posts within County Health. For example, a Sibery employee, Robert Hamilton, was until recently chief operating officer of Provident Hospital. Another, David Sibery, was until recently head of support services for the health system.


Turning leadership over to executives hired by outside, commercial firms has lead to concern.
The role consultants play at County Health is the object of strong criticism from doctors, nurses and other staff members who say they fear that consultants driven by the bottom line are at odds with the system’s obligation to serve Cook County’s neediest patients. Hundreds of front-line staff members have been laid off in the last two years.
One particular concern was the lay-offs directed by yet another group of consultants.
The county decided to close Oak Forest based in part on the advice of Navigant Consulting, which in a 2009 report found that Cook County’s hospitals were overstaffed compared to those of other health systems. Navigant’s assessment also formed the basis for the layoff of 1,350 people systemwide in the last two years.

Doctors, nurses and union leaders argued that Navigant’s calculations were flawed.

Most troubling are allegations that outsourced leadership by commercial consultants is stifling health care professionals' input into the system, including perhaps whistle-blowing about threats to its core mission:
A doctor at a county clinic who would not let his name be used because he feared losing his job said consultants were 'coming at it like our county system is a system that could make money.'

The purpose of the system 'is to take care of people regardless of their ability to pay,' the doctor said. 'If they want to get out of that commitment, that’s fine, but they’re going to leave people in the dust.'

In addition,
A nonunion supervisor, who would speak only on the condition that her name not be used for fear of retaliation, said the constant presence of consultants — and a lack of clear results — was undermining staff morale.

'I’ve never seen employee morale as low as it is now, at all levels,' the supervisor said.

A survey of employees conducted by management in January found that fewer than a third of health system employees think senior managers are 'trustworthy' or have 'a sincere interest in the well-being of employees.' The survey also found that more than half of employees do not think they can voice their opinion without fear of retaliation.

Dr. Richard David, co-director of neonatal intensive care at Stroger Hospital, said doctors were frustrated that Pricewaterhouse consultants had not sought their advice and seemingly ignored opinions offered by medical staff members.

Dr. David said cuts most likely recommended by consultants were interfering with patient care in his unit. He cited calls from other doctors that go unanswered because staff reductions have left only one desk clerk, who also covers another unit.
So it appears that through the miracle of out-sourcing, nominally public hospitals can now be lead by hired executives from commercial firms, whose corporate culture may be more about laissez faire capitalism than serving the poor. 
SSM Health Care

The second NY Times article was about the exit of nuns as leaders of Catholic hospitals and health systems.  In summary,
In 1968, nuns or priests served as chief executives of 770 of the country’s 796 Catholic hospitals, according to the Catholic Health Association. Today, they preside over 8 of 636 hospitals. ... only 8 of 59 Catholic health care systems are directed by religious executives.

The focus of the article was on the retirement of Sister Mary Jean Ryan as CEO of SSM Health Care, (SSM honors Sisters of St. Mary, a predecessor of the Franciscan Sisters of Mary, the Sister's order). Sister Mary Jean Ryan was not a typical hospital system CEO:
her legacy ... extends to preaching about the dignity of patients, paying blue-collar workers above scale, making her hospitals smoke-free, banning the use of foam cups and plastic water bottles, and insisting on gender-neutral and nonviolent language. There are no 'bullet points' in SSM presentations, and photographs are 'enlarged,' never 'blown up.'

Even Sister Mary Jean can struggle to define precisely what the nuns brought to their hospitals. 'There is this thing called presence, she said, explaining that she was trained to see Jesus in the face of every patient....

Also, her leadership:
meant turning away business arrangements with doctors who decline to accept Medicaid. It has meant discounting treatment for the poor and offering charity care to the uninsured, just as the order’s founders did. The St. Louis nuns’ earliest ledgers denoted patients unable to pay as 'Our dear Lord’s.'

But Sister Mary Jean has left, and this, and the general loss of religious leadership of Catholic hospitals and health systems:
has stirred angst in many Catholic hospitals about whether the values imparted by the nuns, concerning the treatment of both patients and employees, can withstand bottom-line forces without their day-to-day vigilance. Although their influence is often described as intangible, the nuns kept their hospitals focused on serving the needy and brought a spiritual reassurance that healing would prevail over profit, authorities on Catholic health care say.

Money is likely to become much more important at SSM:
Mr. William P Thompson, Sister Mary Jean’s handpicked successor, said he planned to hold fast to her commitment to patients, the environment and nonviolence. But he also acknowledged that he would be 'trying to drive more efficiencies in the system.'

One cannot help but wonder if these "efficiencies" will resemble those deployed by the outsourced consultant leadership of Cook County. 

On Private Equity and Catholic Hospitals

Furthermore, there is reason to think that Catholic, non-profit hospitals and health care systems may become even more like commercial firms. An article in HealthLeaders Media about the increasing interest by private equity firms in non-profit hospitals and health care systems noted,
[A] well-publicized deal was the buyout of Massachusetts-based Caritas Christi Health Care, which was a nonprofit, by Cerberus Capital Management. [see our posts here and here] The 2010 sale not only gave Caritas a cash infusion, but altered its tax status to for-profit. These acquisitions moved to center stage the use of private equity capital as a strategic opportunity for healthcare leaders.

For instance, this past February, the nation's largest Catholic health system, Ascension Health, partnered with the Stamford, CT–based private equity firm Oak Hill Capital Partners, embarking on a joint venture to buy Catholic hospitals.

Leo P. Brideau, FACHE, president and CEO of the St. Louis–based Ascension Health Care Network, says the joint venture allows the organization to provide an alternative funding source for the acquisition of Catholic healthcare entities.

Then,
Brideau says seeing other Catholic hospitals financially flounder—only to be sold to non-Catholic entities—aligns with the organization's mission to grow its network of Catholic hospitals. The vision to strengthen Catholic healthcare was another driver for Ascension's partnership with Oak Hill Capital.

However, the article raises further concerns about whether private equity's interest in non-profit, particularly Catholic hospitals will help these institutions' missions.  The thinking of one private equity expert was:
The core goal of a nonprofit hospital or health system is to provide patients with high-quality, cost-effective care, while earning a healthy margin; private equity firms have a different end goal. The general aim of a private equity firm is to achieve a large return on investment in the form of capital gains. How the private equity firm achieves those ends is where hospitals need to do their homework, [managing partner of Linden Capital Partners Brian] Miller says.

Despite what private equity gurus may think, non-profit hospitals' missions never used to make a goal "earning a healthy margin" co-equal with that of taking good care of patients. It does not appear that achieving "a large return on investment" will be compatible with the traditional culture of Catholic hospitals in which "healing would prevail over profit."

Nor does it appear compatible with the recent words of Pope Benedict XVI (as reported by the AP, via the Boston Globe):
'The economy doesn’t function with market self-regulation but needs an ethical reason to work for mankind,' he told reporters traveling aboard the papal plane. 'Man must be at the center of the economy, and the economy cannot be measured only by maximization of profit but rather according to the common good.'

He said the current crisis shows that a moral dimension isn’t 'exterior' to economic problems but 'interior and fundamental.'

Summary

As hospitals and health systems are increasingly lead by people from the world of business, at a time when business culture increasingly believes "greed is good," the fundamental values of hospitals and health care professionals are more often ignored, if not directly threatened. 

To repeat, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

More Executives Prospering Despite the Financial Distress of their Hospitals

Cases that demonstrate the contrast between compensation given to the hired executives of health care organizations and their or their organizations' performance continue to appear.  Last week we discussed how freely million dollar plus compensation is given to executives of nominally non-profit hospitals, and discussed how well some executives were paid just prior to charges of financial mismanagement, arrests or guilty pleas that drove them from their jobs.

I have also found a series of cases of executives whose pay seemed disproportionate in the context of their institutions' financial difficulties.  Here they are, discussed in alphabetical order.

Greenwich Hospital, Connecticut

According to GreenwichTime.com, here is the context:
Greenwich Hospital went under the knife on Wednesday, announcing the layoffs of 36 employees and a series of cutbacks to what it characterized as non-core programs to offset the loss of revenue from a newly implemented state hospital tax.

A Yale-New Haven Health System affiliate and the town's largest employer, the hospital estimated it needs to make up for $8.5 million in lost revenue.

The hospital's top administrator blamed the situation on the state, which now gets a 4.6 percent cut of all hospital income as part of a flat tax enacted on July 1.

While the CEO announced cuts in services, he was not about to cut his own compensation:
'If they're doing so much cost-cutting, what are they doing about [hospital CEO Frank] Corvino's $1.5 million salary?' [former town first selectman Richard] Bergstresser said. 'It seems to me that they should do some trimming before they do layoffs.'

Note that a hospital public relations official had the usual explanation:
Yale New Haven Health System uses a third-party consultant to gauge executive compensation levels, according [hospital spokesman George]Pawlush, who said that Corvino wears two hats.

In addition to his duties as hospital president and chief executive, Corvino is executive vice president of Yale New Haven Health System.

'Each organization contributes half of Frank's total earnings,' Pawlush said. 'Frank's experience in hospital administration has given him the skills needed to successfully balance both of these highly demanding roles simultaneously.'
So in summary, the CEO of a hospital forced to make lay-offs and close popular programs was paid more than $1 million a year because of his great "skills."
Hoboken University Medical Center (HUMC), New Jersey

The context here is a bit complicated. First, according to the Jersey Journal,
The Hoboken hospital was ... in a sea of debt when it was called St. Mary Hospital. In early 2008 the city took over the hospital and its $52 million debt, but the city has never sought to remain in the business of running a hospital.

So,
The HMHA, the board that oversees the operations and sale of the HUMC, is in exclusive negotiations with HUMC Holdco, whose proposal was chosen over seven others last month.

As negotiations about the sale of the distressed hospital continued, the Jersey Journal then reported,
the hospital's manager, Hudson Healthcare Inc., recently declared bankruptcy. Earlier this week, HMHA Chairperson Toni Tomarazzo said that declaring bankruptcy was a necessary step in facilitating the sale,

However, just before then, as a reporter from the Newark Star-Ledger found out,
Less than three weeks before the operator of the city-owned Hoboken University Hospital filed for bankruptcy — putting millions of dollars in taxpayer money and union pension funds at risk — the hospital’s chief executive received a six-figure payout, records show.

Spiros Hatiras, 46, stepped down as chief executive on July 16 after two years on the job with a severance package that includes $600,000 in compensation and full medical benefits for a year, according to records obtained under the Open Public Records Act.

In addition,
A physical therapist who rose through the hospital’s ranks, Hatiras was earning a $400,000 a year and incentive bonuses at the time of his resignation, records show; his contract was set to expire in five months, and called for a severance payment only in the event the hospital terminated the contract.

The package was negotiated by Hudson Healthcare Inc., the current operator of the hospital that filed for bankruptcy protection, and was approved by the Hoboken Municipal Hospital Authority.

Initially, no one could come up with a clear explanation. First,
Doug Petkus, a spokesman for the authority, said officials 'cannot' comment on the issue.

Then, the Hoboken mayor made this attempt, per the Jersey Journal,
Asked why the HMHA decided to give Hatiras the generous severance even though it didn't have to, Mayor Dawn Zimmer, also an HMHA commissioner, skirted the question.

'Given the totality of the circumstances, this was the best way to save our hospital and relieve our taxpayers of a $52 million bond guarantee.

Asked if that meant the sale of the hospital was contingent upon Hatiras receiving the lucrative severance, Zimmer said 'Given the totality of the circumstances, this was the best way to save our hospital and relieve our taxpayers of a $52 million bond guarantee.'

Finally, the Jersey Journal reported this version:
The Hoboken Municipal Hospital Authority (HMHA) was obligated to pay out a $600,000 severance package to the former Hoboken University Medical Center CEO because he met the conditions of his contract for the lucrative parting gift, according to HMHA chairwoman Toni Tomarazzo.

Tomarazzo refuted stories that appeared in The Jersey Journal, Star-Ledger, and online at NJ.com that said the HMHA, the city entity that runs the hospital, was not bound to pay Spiro Hatiras the severance amount because he resigned.

Hatiras’ contract called for payment of the severance package 'upon termination, non-renewal or expiration of the term of Employment Agreement,' according to the HMHA resolution authorizing payment.

'It was a contractual obligation,' Tomarazzo said. 'There was nothing we could do about it.'

The resolution said 'even though the employment ended through a mutual agreement to step aside and cease to serve as CEO that shall be documented in a resignation letter...' the HMHA agreed that Hatiras 'is entitled to' the severance package.
So, in summary, the CEO of  a public hospital deeply in debt, and which had to be sold to a for-profit corporation, received a substantial golden parachute just prior to its operating authority's bankruptcy filing.  The only explanation was that this payment was a contractual obligation, which, of course, begged some questions: knowing that the hospital was in a perilous financial condition, why did the authority write such severance into the contract, and if it did not intend that severance should be paid under the conditions which finally obtained, why is the authority not disputing the payments?

Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, New York

According to the New York Post, here is the context.
The 326-bed facility is considered one of five Brooklyn hospitals that advocates fear is in danger of being shuttered by Gov. Cuomo's medical redesign team. Many of Kingsbrook's patients are Medicaid recipients.

Furthermore, in 2009,
the hospital was forced to close a clinic and lay off workers and staff members took furloughs because of budget tightening.

However,
hospital officials defended Brady's compensation, noting she was paid $1,094,443 in base salary in 2009 - and that $2,891,335 will be doled out as retirement and deferred compensation she accumulated from 30 years of service.


Brady also received $215,241 in bonuses and nontaxed benefits in 2009.

The Post asserted that her total compensation of over $4 million was "more than any other nonprofit hospital executive in the state."

Her previous two years' compensation was slightly more modest, but still greater than the magic $1 million a year:
In 2008, Brady took home $1,054,406 in base pay plus an additional $137,335 in deferred compensation and nontaxable benefits, tax records show.

In 2007, she hauled in $1,023,452 in base salary plus $195,661 in deferred compensation, the records show.

The chairman of the hospital board's finance committee offered the usual rationalization:
'Dr. Brady's compensation is, in fact, at market rate and reflects the board's full faith in her abilities and execution of her job,' said Ed Lieberstein, chairman of the Kingsbrook board of trustees' finance committee.
So, in summary, the CEO of a small non-profit hospital threatened with closure and forced to lay-off workers and close programs was paid over $4 million, supposedly the "market rate."  One wonders if the "market" here was that including small, financially distressed hospitals?

MetroHealth Medical Center, Ohio

This public, not for profit Cleveland, Ohio health care system has had its share of troubles lately, as the Cleveland Plain Dealer noted,
MetroHealth, the county's safety-net hospital, has faced a myriad of economic hurdles and is still undergoing what its leaders call a turnaround: The system reported a $2.2 million loss on net income in 2007. It continued to bleed money in early 2008, losing $11 million in the first quarter, according to long-time trustee and now MetroHealth Board Chair Ron Fountain.

So, when a new CEO, Mark Moran, was hired to turn the system around, per the Plain Dealer,
'At MetroHealth, starting in 2008, we turned over every chief -- the chief financial officer, chief executive, chief operating officer, chief medical officer, everybody,' said MetroHealth board member Thomas McDonald, who has been on the voluntary board since March 2008. 'We had to get the ship righted.'

While doing so, however, the new leadership saw fit to reward those it pushed out the door,
The MetroHealth System has agreed to pay more than $4 million for consulting contracts in lieu of severance to top executives and high-level employees who have left the county-owned hospital since 2008.

The contracts, similar to the one the hospital granted to departing Chief Financial Officer Sharon Kelley, have provided salary and benefits, in some cases up to one year, to dozens of departing employees. The deals also include up to $114,000 in performance bonuses for three executives.

The agreements allow for continued accrual of vacation pay benefits and continued contributions to the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System. The work required of employees under the contracts is not specified.

CEO Moran later acknowledged that the "consulting agreements" really did not require any consulting to be done, again in the Plain Dealer,
Awarding what Moran called 'employee transition contracts' lowered the risk of potential litigation and provided access to the institutional knowledge of the departing employees. He acknowledged, however, that most of the employees 'probably didn't' do any work.

Mr Moran explained the need for such severance packages thus:
the amount MetroHealth pays its executives, including severance, is necessary to compete against the Cleveland Clinic and University Hospitals for qualified professionals.

However, MetroHealth was not exactly competing to keep these executives, it was trying to get them to leave.

Furthermore, while the health care system has just gotten beyond its financial distress, the compensation given to its current executives has surged ahead, again according to the Plain Dealer,
The pay packages of MetroHealth System's top-tier executives -- base salary plus potential incentives -- ranks near the top 25 percent when compared to that of similarly sized health systems, according to a report by a national compensation adviser.

The report, completed in April and provided to The Plain Dealer last week, provides an inside-look at the way MetroHealth pays 18 executives when county leaders and the public have questioned the spending practices of the county-owned health system.

MetroHealth hired Mercer, as it has for at least four years, to review the system's executive-level pay and severance policy to determine if they were in line with industry averages.

What Mercer found this year was a staff with "more competitive pay levels than has historically been the case" -- including one salary so high that the firm suggested a review of whether it was "reasonable."

That concerned one board member,
MetroHealth board member John Moss, who reviewed the report for the first time late last week, called it "disconcerting." He was particularly bothered by the salaries, saying the health system's administration had told the board that the compensation was "closer to the middle."

"They seem to be closer to the top 25 percentile," Moss said. "[It's] not what we've been told."

Can anyone guess the justification for the lucrative payments given by the CEO?
Moran goes on to write that the contracts 'support our ability to recruit the best and brightest talent.'
So, in summary, many executives of a public hospital that had been in financial distress were discharged, but given large "consulting payments" which appeared to be golden parachutes.  The new executives were paid at very high rates compared to some sort of market because they were "the best and the brightest."
Summary

So we see more cases of executive exceptionalism.  The hired executives of health care organizations, including non-profit and public hospitals, seem to prosper financially regardless of their organizations' financial status.  The executives, their boards of trustees and the hospitals' own hired public relations staff may justify the financial success of their leaders by referring to "market" conditions, which do not seem to be references to "markets" consisting of financially troubled hospitals, and by praising their leaders' abilities, including literally calling them "the best and the brightest," without any obvious evidence supporting their claims.

To an outsider, it just seems like the hospitals are now run primarily for the financial benefit of their hired leaders.  The problems seem to be:

-  Paying the leaders so well (and supporting the public relations staff who sing their praises) costs money that could better be used to provide actual health care.

-  Providing such perverse incentives, which seem entirely unrelated to the hospitals' ability to uphold their primary patient care  and public health missions (and academic mission if applicable), is likely to detract from the hospitals' ability to support these missions.

-  It is likely that employees of such institutions who actually try to uphold the mission will be demoralized by the realization that their leaders' enrichment comes first, further damaging the hospitals' ability to uphold the mission.

-  Finally, it is possible that such perverse incentives attract leaders who are particularly unsuited to the task of upholding the mission.

One cannot help but notice that the quaint notion that hospitals exist to uphold patient care, public health, or academic missions rarely is acknowledged nowadays in discussion of hospital leadership.

Turning blue in the face, I say again... Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

What Goes Up - Non-Profit Hospital CEO Compensation Continues to Defy Gravity

We have frequently discussed the disconnect between incentives, particularly total compensation, given to the leaders of health care organizations and their roles, or lack thereof, in improving the health care of their patients or the public. One measure of that disconnect is how leaders' pay continues to defy gravity while the economy continues to suffer, and health care dysfunction continues to fester.

In particular, total compensation given to CEOs of ostensibly not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems is increasingly passing the magic $1 million mark. A round up including two recent articles and others from the last four months that we have not discussed before revealed more "million dollar babies" amongst the ranks of these leaders.  (Note that most of the data came from 2009, not a particularly good year for the economy as a whole.)

UA Healthcare, Phoenix area, Arizona - $1.7 million

As reported by the Arizona Daily Star in April, "UA Healthcare interim CEO Kevin Burns received a financial package worth about $1.7 million when he left his post last week, the chairman of the UA Healthcare board said. Under terms of his contract, Burns qualified for two years' base pay plus benefits when he left his position. His annual base pay as interim CEO was $620,000, said Granger Vinall, UA Healthcare board chair."

Baptist Health, Jacksonville area, Florida - $1.2 million

According to the Florida Times-Union in May, Hugh Green, CEO of the Baptist Health system, made $1.2 million.

Florida Hospital Waterman, Orlando area, Florida - $1.7 million

As reported by the Orlando Sentinel in May, in 2009, Ken Mattison, president and CEO of Florida Hospital Waterman had total compensation of $1.7 million, which included "a lump sum pay-out of pension monies."

Multiple hospitals, Boston, Massachusetts - $1.2 - $2.1 million

According to an August Boston Globe article, in 2009, reported salaries of CEOs at Boston hospitals including: for the late CEO of Partners HealthCare, "then-chief executive James J. Mongan earned a total of $2.1 million, including salary, bonus, and other compensation"; for CEOs of two Partners hospitals, "current Partners chief executive, Gary L. Gottlieb, earned $1.6 million in 2009 as president of Brigham and Women’s, the same amount he got in 2008. Peter L. Slavin, president of Mass. General, earned $1.4 million in 2009, also the same as the year before"; "Elaine S. Ullian, former chief executive of Boston Medical Center, a Boston University teaching hospital, drew total compensation of $1.8 million in 2009"; and "Tufts Medical Center paid its chief executive, Ellen M. Zane, about $1.2 million in 2009, equal to her 2008 compensation."

Multiple hospitals, mid-west US - $1.8 - $6 million

Per MedCity News in August, "Nine percent of nonprofit hospital chief executives in the Midwest are paid more than $1 million a year, according to a new report." The top 20 CEOs in terms of compensation, based on the latest (2008 or 2009) figures were:
Randall O’Donnell; Children’s Mercy Hospital and Clinics; Kansas City, Missouri: $6 million
Javon Bea; Mercy Health System; Janesville, Wisconsin: $4.5 million
James Skogsbergh; Advocate Health Care; Oak Brook, Illinois: $4 million
Dean Harrison; Northwestern Memorial Hospital; Chicago, Illinois: $3.4 million
Richard Pettingill; Allina Health System; Minneapolis, Minnesota: $3.3 million
Joseph Swedish; Trinity Health; Novi, Michigan: $2.7 million
Lowell Kruse; Heartland Regional Medical Center; St. Joseph, Missouri: $2.5 million
Steven Lipstein; BJC Health System; St. Louis, Missouri: $2.2 million
Kevin Schoeplein; OSF Healthcare System; Peoria, Illinois: $2.2 million
Thomas Sieber; Genesis Healthcare System; Zanesville, Ohio: $2.1 million
Paul Pawlak; Silver Cross Hospital; Joliet, Illinois: $2 million
Toby Cosgrove; Cleveland Clinic; Cleveland, Ohio: $1.9 million
William Petasnick; Froedtert Memorial Hospital; Milwaukee, Wisconsin: $1.9 million
Fred Manchur; Kettering Medical Center; Dayton, Ohio: $1.9 million
Patrick Magnon; Children’s Memorial Hospital; Chicago, Illinois: $1.8 million
Kenneth Hanover; University Hospital; Cincinnati, Ohio: $1.8 million
J. Luke McGuinness; Central Dupage Hospital; Winfield, Illinois: $1.8 million
Daniel Evans Jr.; Clarian Health Partners; Indianapolis, Indiana: $1.8 million
James Madera; University of Chicago Medical Center; Chicago, Illinois: $1.8 million
James Anderson; Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center; Cincinnati, Ohio: $1.8 million

Where All CEOs Are Above Average

A repeated theme of these articles was that CEO pay continues to rise because those who set it often seem to believe that their CEOs, like the children of mythical Lake Woebegone, are above average, or at least that they are never below average. For example, in the Arizona Star article we learn:
UMC Corp. raised Burns' pay after consulting with a third-party compensation and benefits expert, and the salary is in approximately the 25th percentile when compared to like institutions on a national basis, [UA Healthcare board of trustees chair Granger] Vinall said. He said that UA Healthcare board's approved policy is to pay in the 50th percentile

In addition, in the [Jacksonville, FL] Times-Union article we find this about Baptist CEO Hugh Greene:
He deserves more because he doesn't just manage one hospital, said Robert Hill, chairman of the Baptist board. Greene oversees a complex health system that includes four adult hospitals, a children's hospital, a large physician network and other subsidiaries.

'We think he's an exceptional CEO,' said Hill, CEO of sales and marketing company Acosta.

That article also included this summary:
hospital boards, which usually consist of community heavy-hitters and local business leaders, often rely on consultants to help set CEO pay.

'The consultants survey the field, looking at salaries of CEOs at nonprofit and for-profit institutions, see what the 50th percentile is and then in many cases offer 20 percent or 30 percent above to qualified candidates,' Maggie Mahar of the nonpartisan think tank the Century Foundation wrote in a recent blog.

There's a problem with this system, she added: 'Mathematically, this keeps the 50th percentile moving up, and what the IRS considers 'reasonable' also moves up.'

Furthermore, the report on mid-west CEOs in the MedCity News provided this opaquely worded corroboration:
'It seems there is a possibility that when executive compensation firms are hired by boards and/or CEOs to provide multiple examples of comparable compensation, the firms may report out the higher end of the comparables,' said Pamela Knecht, president of Accord Limited, a Chicago-based healthcare governance consulting firm, in the report.

Summary

I am willing to admit that it may make sense to set compensation for hospital (and other health care) leaders in the context of what the population of such leaders are paid.  However, it makes no logical sense for the boards of trustees who set non-profit hospital CEOs' pay to deny the possibility that some of these CEOs must be below average.  Yet boards never seem to allow that their CEOs could be below average at the times when the pay decisions are made.  The only times we seem to hear about less than average CEOs are when their performance has been publicly embarrassing enough for them to lose their jobs, if not go to jail.  Even in such situations, the bad behavior never seems to have been foreshadowed in any way, particularly not by previous pay cuts (see this post for recent examples.) 

So why do hospital (and other health care) boards seem to deny the possibility that their CEOs may be below average, or worse?  As we have discussed before, perhaps it is due to ego bias.  Judgment and decision psychologists have shown that people often overestimate their own performance, or the performance of those with whom they are affiliated.  Also, the boards of trustees who are supposed to steward hospitals and other health care non-profits are often made up of current or retired CEOs or other top leaders of other organizations.  They may overestimate the performance of fellow members of the C-level officers' guild, or be afraid to criticize it.

In any case, we are seeing more and more flagrant examples of the perverse incentives existing in health care, especially as given to health care leaders, resulting in worsening accountability and increasing sense of entitlement.  So I say again.... 

Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

The Best and the Brightest Behaving Badly

To err is human, and any group of humans can be expected to include those who stray.  However, the constant spin that surrounds most top leaders of health care organizations seems to suggest that these people are different.  In particular, the lavish compensation given leaders of health care organizations is often justified by claims that those in leadership positions are the best and the brightest. 

Catching up after a vacation afforded me the opportunity to go through a large volume of news stories, leading to a collection of those from the last year that showed the contrast between such compensation and behavior that was far from the "best and the brightest. "

North Memorial Health Care CEO Pleads Guilty to Engaging in Prostitution

As reported by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, after David Cress "was arrested Sept 1 [2010] during a vice operation."  The plea bargain will allow that "the charge against him will be vacated in a year."

According to the health care system's 2009 IRS form 990, Mr Cress total compensation was then $984,412.  In addition, that year he received a SERP [ supplemental executive retirement plan] payment of $3,393,712.

Childrens' Hospital of Philadelphia Chief Counsel Pleads Guilty to Theft

As reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer:
Roosevelt Hairston Jr., 46, the former general counsel of Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, pleaded guilty today to stealing $1.7 million from the institution.

He could face six or more years in federal prison.

Although his attorney claimed that Hairston is not "a greedy person," he did live "in a 7,000-square-foot home."  The hospital's 2009 IRS form 990 showed that Hairston's total compensation then was $602,982.

Franciscan Hospital for Children CEO Dismissed for Financial Irregularities

As reported by the Boston Globe,
The board of Franciscan Hospital for Children in Boston, one of the country’s largest hospitals for severely disabled children, has fired its longtime chief executive, Paul J. DellaRocco, citing financial irregularities.

Board chairman Robert Needham said yesterday in written comments to the Globe that DellaRocco was 'inappropriately submitting and documenting expenses.'

'This type of behavior is clearly at odds with both our policies and our nonprofit mission,' he said. 'We therefore took proactive steps to remove him from the position.'

This seems worse because of the hospital's difficult financial position:
Franciscan, which has relied on donations and state Medicaid funding to cover its costs for most of its 60-year history, had struggled financially in recent years. In 2009, the hospital laid off 40 people, or 10 percent of its workforce, and asked all employees, including DellaRocco, to take a 2 to 3 percent pay cut.

Nonetheless, "the hospital had loaned DellaRocco $150,000 a year earlier to help him finance construction of a retirement home on the Caribbean island of St Martin...." Furthermore, findings released after divorce litigation revealed DellaRocco's lavish lifestyle apparently at the hospital's expense:
DellaRocco owns a company, Haelen Health Systems Inc., which has a management contract with Franciscan. He used Haelen’s assets to pay for many of his personal expenses, including entertainment and interest on his personal loan from Franciscan, according to Judge Dorothy M. Gibson of Middlesex Probate and Family Court in her findings of fact in the divorce. He and his wife invested more than $1.8 million in the St. Martin villa, much of it coming from Haelen, the judge wrote.

In the divorce, Gibson noted the 'upper middle-class lifestyle' the DellaRoccos enjoyed. They honeymooned for a month in Tahiti, Thailand, Bali, Singapore, and Australia. He furnished their $950,000 Weston home with more than $85,000 in furniture, jewelry, electronics, and antiques.

DellaRocco’s compensation from Franciscan was $225,000 in the fiscal year that ended in September 2009, according to the hospital’s most recent filings with the Massachusetts attorney general’s office. His total income, including wages from the hospital, capital gains, and profits from his company, was about $674,000 in 2007 and about $348,000 in 2008.

Slidell Memorial Hospital CEO Fired After Second DWI Arrest

As reported by Nola.com,
Slidell Memorial Hospital's chief executive officer lost his job Thursday after a recent drunken driving arrest, his second in six years.

The nine members of the public, not-for-profit hospital's board of commissioners fired Robert Hawley Jr. at the end of a regular public meeting held at a cancer treatment complex he helped build. Immediately after his fate was decided, Hawley left the room silently, rode an elevator to the bottom floor, climbed into the passenger seat of a sport-utility vehicle waiting for him in the parking lot and drove off.

'Mr. Hawley's ... arrest ... made this decision necessary,' board Chairman Larry Englande said. 'As a community hospital, we insist upon the highest standards of care for the patients and families we serve.'

'We require that our physicians, nurses, employees and management team live up to those high standards. We must expect no less from our chief executive officer.'

The account of his arrest was as follows:
On the day he was jailed, Hawley drove a blue, convertible BMW past crossover No. 1 near the end of the northbound Causeway about 4 a.m. A bridge police officer reportedly noticed him weaving in and out of his lane. The officer got behind Hawley, but Hawley allegedly changed lanes and accelerated to about 80 mph, or 15 mph over the speed limit, still swerving, bridge general manager Carlton Dufrechou has said.

The officer turned his patrol lights on and pulled over Hawley immediately after they exited the Causeway. Hawley had bloodshot eyes and the smell of alcohol on his breath, the officer reported. He also allegedly swayed when he got out of the car, told the officer he was going home after 'having a couple of beers' on the south shore and performed poorly in a field sobriety test, Dufrechou said Thursday.

Hawley underwent a breath test. Although his precise blood-alcohol level has not been publicized, the test indicated that 'he was impaired,' or over the state's limit of 0.08, Dufrechou added.

It was Hawley's second DWI arrest since 2005. A state trooper pulled him over on the early morning of March 13 that year for supposedly driving left of center on U.S. 190 south of Interstate 12 near Mandeville. State Police alleged Hawley had an open alcoholic beverage in his car. He submitted to a breath test, registered 0.124 and spent several hours in jail.

Court records do not show how the case was disposed of. Hawley has declined to discuss it.

I cannot find any public record of Mr Hawley's compensation.

Summary

As noted earlier, we are all human, and we are all prone to failings.  That health care organizational executives sometimes are also prone to failings should not be news.  It is only because their fawning public relations departments and cozy boards have insisted they have no failings, which is why they are paid so much more than most of their dedicated employees who actually care for patients.

We should not expect health care leaders to be perfect.  However, we also should not award them power and pay as if they were.